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1245 
DIVORCE EQUALITY 
 
Allison Anna Tait
*
 
 
Abstract: The battle for marriage equality has been spectacularly successful, producing 
great optimism about the transformation of marriage. The struggle to revolutionize the 
institution of marriage is, however, far from over. Next is the battle for divorce equality. 
With the initial wave of same-sex divorces starting to appear on court dockets, this Article 
addresses the distinctive property division problems that have begun to arise with same-sex 
divorce and that threaten, in the absence of rule reform, to both amplify and reinscribe 
problems with the conventional marital framework. Courts have failed to realize the 
cornerstone concept of equitable distribution—marriage as an economic partnership—in the 
context of different-sex marriage. Because same-sex divorce highlights this failing, this 
Article uses same-sex divorce as a lens through which to reexamine the untapped potential of 
equitable distribution statutes. 
Two questions drive the analysis. One question is how to decide which assets count as 
marital property and how to value one spouse’s contributions to the other spouse’s career 
success. I propose that courts characterize enhanced earning capacity as marital property and 
count indirect spousal contributions toward the growth in value of business assets. Without 
these changes, courts fail to capture the nature of marital partnership and properly 
compensate contributions made by non-earning spouses. Another question, made salient by 
same-sex “hybrid” cases in which the spouses have been long-term cohabiting partners but 
short-term marital partners, is how to determine when an economic partnership begins. I 
propose that courts use the category of “pre-marital” property in order to count assets and 
income acquired outside of the marriage itself. 
Addressing these questions is critical to the reformation of marriage because property 
rules impact how spouses bargain with one another, how diverse roles get valued in marital 
bargains, and how we assign and perform gender within marriage. Moreover, proper 
compensation for spousal contributions rewards individuals for making choices that benefit 
the couple rather than the individual, which is normatively positive behavior. These 
proposals for rule reform provide guidance for courts, both those encountering an increasing 
number of same-sex divorces as well those deliberating over how best to assess spousal 
contributions in different-sex marriages. Furthermore, the proposals in this Article provide a 
blueprint for advocates who seek to continue the work of marriage equality in the hopes of 
further unwinding the power of gender within marriage. 
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INTRODUCTION 
First comes marriage; then comes divorce. Different-sex couples have 
experienced this truism for centuries. Now, following close on the 
successes of the marriage equality movement, the first wave of same-sex 
couples is seeking to get divorced.
1
 The current revolutionary moment in 
                                                     
* Assistant Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. For comments and conversation, my 
thanks go to Erez Aloni, Richard Brooks, Jessica Clarke, Hanoch Dagan, Deborah Dinner, Elizabeth 
Emens, Martha Ertman, Katherine Franke, Debra Guston, Meredith Harbach, Claudia Haupt, 
Michael Heller, Patricia Hennessey, Suzanne Kahn, Alicia Kelly, Suzanne Kim, Serena Mayeri, 
Michael McHugh, Rachel Rebouche, Cathy Sakimura, Carol Sanger, Elizabeth Scott, Julie Shapiro, 
Sarah Swan, Kendall Thomas, and Joan Williams. My thanks go as well to the editorial staff of this 
journal whose work and input were invaluable. Finally, I benefitted greatly from the input of the 
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the progress of marriage law promises to shift conventional gendered 
understandings of the institution. Yet, in order to make good on this 
promise, it is necessary to reexamine the rules governing marital 
property and equitable distribution. Much of the work that gender 
performs in a marriage is not revealed until the moment of divorce, 
when couples and courts are asked to value the contributions of 
individual spouses to the marriage.
2
 If same-sex marriage is to transform 
the institution of marriage,
3
 law must reflect equality not only at entry 
                                                     
participants in the New York area family law workshop, participants in the 2015 LSA panel “New 
Forms of Intimate Ordering,” participants in the 2015 Family Law Scholars and Teachers 
Conference, participants in the 2015 Association of American Law Schools mid-year meeting panel 
on “The Impact of Same-Sex Marriage,” and members of the Associates and Fellows workshop at 
Columbia Law School.  
1. See, e.g., Joe Coscarelli, Gay-Marriage Pioneers Recall ‘Huge Journey,’ NYMAG.COM (June 
26, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2013/06/julie-hillary-goodridge-on-gay-
marriage-supreme-court.html (“Julie and Hillary Goodridge are no longer married, but the important 
thing is that they were . . . . Part of the importance of marriage includes divorce and the laws that 
then govern a breakup.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Julie and Hillary Goodridge were the 
plaintiffs in the landmark case Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 
2003) (holding limitation of civil marriage to male-female unions under Massachusetts marriage 
licensing statutes unconstitutional under Massachusetts constitution). See also Tracy Connor, 
Lesbian Couple Who Got Hitched Shortly After Gay Marriage Became Legal in New York State Set 
to Become One of First Gay Divorces, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 25, 2012, 11:44 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/gay-divorces-finalized-state-article-1.1102288 (“It was 
inevitable. The legalization of gay marriage in New York is yielding the first wave of gay 
divorces.”); Clyde Haberman, After Same-Sex Marriage, Same-Sex Divorce, N.Y. TIMES CITY 
ROOM (June 27, 2011, 8:34 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/27/after-same-sex-
marriage-same-sex-divorce/ (noting possible “complications” attending impending wave of same-
sex divorces).  
2. See FREDERICK HERTZ & EMILY DOSKOW, MAKING IT LEGAL: A GUIDE TO SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIPS & CIVIL UNIONS 61 (2014) (“The legal implications of 
marriage take on their real meaning when couples separate.”). 
3. Some commentators and scholars argue that same-sex marriage will transform marriage by 
making it a more gender-equitable institution. See, e.g., Thomas B. Stoddard, Why Gay People 
Should Seek the Right to Marry, in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE 13, 14–16 (Suzanne Sherman ed., 
1992); William N. Eskridge, Jr., A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419, 1487–88 
(1993); Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: 
REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 9, 18–19 (1991). Others are more skeptical and have argued 
that “[m]arriage runs counter to two of the primary goals of the lesbian and gay movement: the 
affirmation of gay identity and culture; and the validation of many forms of relationships.” Paula L. 
Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q. 
(1989), reprinted in WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN, CASES ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (West. 
Pub. Co. 1997), at 14; see also Katherine M. Franke, The Politics of Same-Sex Marriage Politics, 
15 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 236 (2006); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why 
Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every 
Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1546 (1993) (“[A]n effort to legalize lesbian and gay marriage 
would make a public critique of the institution of marriage impossible.”). For a good overview of 
the debates as well as interviews with same-sex couples regarding their perspective on marriage, see 
KATHLEEN E. HULL, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE: THE CULTURAL POLITICS OF LOVE AND THE LAW 78–
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but also upon exit. 
Over forty years ago, as part of another “divorce revolution,” 
legislatures enacted equitable distribution statutes to make divorce less 
acrimonious and more gender equitable. Equitable distribution statutes 
modernized divorce law by removing fault as a dispositive factor and 
making economic partnership the cornerstone concept of property 
division. Lawmakers sought to compensate housewives and mothers, 
who were typically hurt financially by divorce, and to reflect the idea 
that both partners in a marriage—the wage earner and the homemaker—
contributed to its economic success. Equitable distribution statutes gave 
courts a directive and the means to properly remunerate the unpaid 
contributions of one spouse to the other’s career and to acknowledge that 
couples acted in partnership as they acquired assets, developed skills, 
and allocated marital roles. The promise of these statutes, however, was 
never fully realized for different-sex couples and, as an increasing 
number of same-sex divorces appear on matrimonial court dockets, 
courts will be forced to grapple with unanswered questions about how to 
make equitable distribution truly equitable. 
Imagine this scenario: Two men living in New York have been in a 
marriage-like relationship for over fifteen years. One is a partner at a 
large law firm, and the other is a lawyer for a small non-profit 
organization making considerably less money. They live together in an 
apartment to which the law firm partner holds the title; he has furnished 
their apartment, bought significant artwork for them to enjoy, and has 
acquired several other types of collections, including a wine collection. 
The non-profit lawyer pays for the majority of their monthly living 
expenses as well as vacations. Moreover, the non-profit lawyer has made 
himself available to travel with his partner for work, and has passed up 
work opportunities in his own job to do so. When New York passed the 
law enabling same-sex marriage, the couple availed themselves of this 
legal right.
4
 After being married for a year, however, the couple decided 
to divorce.
5
 
With significant resources at stake at the dissolution of this long-term 
relationship, a judge will likely limit the marital property to assets 
acquired and earnings generated during the brief period of legal 
marriage, as prescribed by state divorce law. Despite the couple’s legal 
                                                     
117 (2006). 
4. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 10-a (McKinney 2011) (“A marriage that is otherwise valid shall 
be valid regardless of whether the parties to the marriage are of the same or different sex.”). 
5. Jesse Green, From “I Do” to “I’m Done,” NYMAG.COM (Feb. 24, 2013), http://nymag.com/ 
news/features/gay-divorce-2013-3/ (noting “gay couples are at the start of a divorce boom”).  
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inability to marry in the first fifteen years of the relationship, those years 
will not likely count for the purposes of the characterization and 
distribution of marital property. Titled property will go to the title-
holder, and each party will have only the most limited rights to the 
other’s non-liquid assets, like pensions or patents. Furthermore, in cases 
of income or earnings asymmetry, any likely award of maintenance or 
rehabilitative alimony will be decreased because of the artificially short 
length of the marital relationship. Finally, any career sacrifices that one 
partner made in order to benefit the other will be un- or under-
compensated. 
Same-sex divorce in cases such as this raises two major questions. 
One question—a question that has plagued different-sex divorce and will 
continue to produce inequality in same-sex divorce—is which assets 
count as marital property and how courts should handle unresolved 
questions about “career assets”—including enhanced earning capacity 
and indirect spousal contributions to business ventures. These career 
assets bring up the twin questions of individual accomplishment as well 
as individual contribution to the relationship. The manner in which 
courts have treated these particular career assets persistently belies the 
ideal of economic partnership, and reinforces the idea that “he who earns 
it, owns it.”6 Addressing career assets is critical. In high-wealth divorces, 
they are worth significant amounts of money; in lower-wealth divorces, 
they are often the only assets of value a couple possesses. On a 
theoretical level, the question is important because conventional courts 
engaging in equitable distribution have persistently undervalued the non-
earning spouse’s contributions to the economic success of the marriage. 
Taking economic partnership seriously requires broadening what counts 
as marital property with respect to career assets and considering 
enhanced earning capacity as marital property. 
Another question—made salient during this exceptional time of 
transitional rights for same-sex couples—is when an economic 
partnership begins. Equitable distribution statutes posit the partnership 
beginning at the moment of marriage. However, taking seriously the idea 
of economic partnership—and, in this exceptional moment, recognizing 
that some couples have been legally barred from marriage—how do 
courts evaluate when a partnership begins? At what point are the 
individuals in a romantic couple sufficiently committed to one another 
that they should be allowed claims to one another’s property? The tide of 
                                                     
6. Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2250 
(1994). 
08 - Tait.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
1250 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1245 
 
same-sex divorces that will inevitably rise—bringing with it new 
“hybrid” cases that involve long-term cohabiting partners and short-term 
marital partners—will push these legal questions into the foreground.7 
State courts have taken on the question in the context of different-sex 
marriages, providing examples of how marital property can be measured 
from points other than marriage. Following these models, I propose that 
courts use the category of “pre-marital” property in order to equitably 
distribute property in hybrid cases. Enlarging the marital grid by 
including pre-marital property in a marital estate instantiates the idea of 
economic partnership and also helps equalize economic injustices that 
may result from financial asymmetries and specialized household labor. 
Answering questions about the practical goals and theoretical 
grounding of equitable distribution at this moment in the evolution of 
marriage law has great consequences. Which property counts and when 
it gets counted impacts the ways in which spouses bargain with one 
another, how diverse roles are valued in these bargains, and how we 
assign and perform gender within marriage. Including career assets and 
pre-marital property in marital estates will help courts actualize the 
stated goals of equitable distribution by identifying marital property 
according to economic partnership values rather than individual earning 
or purchasing power. Genuine equitable distribution will benefit all 
spouses who take on a non- or low-earning role in their partnerships—
whether to raise children, change careers, or pursue meaningful but 
unremunerated work. 
Achieving divorce equality is also important because longstanding 
social policy and cultural norms promote the ideal of sharing in 
marriage. The sharing norm has historically been evident in marital 
property rules that discourage spouses from keeping an accounting of 
debts and credits within marriage and that disallow most claims based on 
this type of domestic accounting. The New Jersey Supreme Court has 
stated: “Marriage is not a business arrangement in which the parties keep 
track of debits and credits, their accounts to be settled upon divorce. 
Rather, as we have said, ‘marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint 
undertaking . . .’”8 The goal from this perspective is to “devise a legal 
framework for divorce that will safeguard those who do not maximize 
their separate interests, but instead engage in unselfish, sharing 
                                                     
7. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court is currently considering this question in the case of Kinney 
v. Busch. See Brief of Appellee, Kinney v. Busch, No. KEN-14-456, available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/cases/kinney-v-busch/kinney-v-busch-appellee-brief.pdf.  
8. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982) (citations omitted). 
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behavior.”9 Proper compensation through equitable distribution rewards 
individuals for sharing and making choices that benefit the unit rather 
than the individual, normatively positive behavior. 
In previous scholarship, family law and feminist scholars 
demonstrated great interest in the topic of equitable distribution as 
statutes were enacted around the country. In the 1980s, scholars 
produced a number of articles detailing the shifts in property regimes, 
ordinarily focusing on divorce reform in a particular state.
10
 As courts 
began to construe the statutes and award divorce settlement using the 
new rubrics, scholars tracked the outcomes in order to gauge the efficacy 
of the statutes.
11
 Since these first two waves of literature about equitable 
distribution—the first primarily descriptive and the second evaluative—
there has been minimal discussion of the equitable distribution in legal 
scholarship.
12
 This Article builds on the body of evaluative literature 
concerning equitable distribution, and adds to it by drawing on robust 
literatures about marital bargaining
13
 and the specialization of household 
labor in both different- and same-sex marriage.
14
 
This Article uses same-sex divorce as a lens through which to 
reexamine the aims and the actualities of equitable distribution as well as 
the notion of economic partnership within intimate relationships. One 
immediate goal is to provide a roadmap for thinking about the new 
marital property claims that will arise during this transitional moment. 
Same-sex couples currently going through property disputes at the 
                                                     
9. Herma Hill Kay, Beyond No-Fault: New Directions in Divorce Reform, in DIVORCE REFORM 
AT THE CROSSROADS 6, 31 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 1990). 
10. See, e.g., Carmen Valle Patel, Treating Professional Goodwill as Marital Property in 
Equitable Distribution States, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554 (1983); Sally Burnett Sharp, Equitable 
Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C. L. REV. 247 (1983). 
11. See generally DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9; Marsha Garrison, Good 
Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable Distribution Law on Divorce 
Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621 (1991); Symposium, Divorce and Feminist Legal Theory, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2119 (1994). 
12. There are some scholars who have taken up the question more recently. See, e.g., Alicia 
Brokars Kelly, Rehabilitating Partnership Marriage as a Theory of Wealth Distribution at Divorce: 
In Recognition of a Shared Life, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 141, 167–76 (2004). 
13. Social science literature about marital bargaining and the problem of career development for 
women who are primary caretakers is extensive. See, e.g., ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT 
(1989); RHONA MAHONY, KIDDING OURSELVES: BREADWINNING, BABIES, AND BARGAINING 
POWER (1995); Williams, supra note 6. 
14. See, e.g., Susan Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex 
Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 98 (2005); Franke, supra note 3; Polikoff, supra note 
3. 
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dissolution of marriage provide a situationally unique and analytically 
rich object of inquiry. The problems confronting these couples 
underscore the limits of conventional marital property distribution and 
revivify long-standing debates about the pitfalls and failures of equitable 
distribution. A second goal is to understand how reshaping equitable 
distribution rules to address same-sex divorce will ultimately benefit 
both same- and different-sex couples by recalibrating the valuation of 
unpaid or indirect spousal contributions and collapsing the gendered 
framework that has supported marriage to date. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. In Part I, I discuss how states 
adopted equitable distribution rules starting in the 1970s and how these 
rules became the primary system of marital property division. I describe 
how these new marital property rules formed part of more sweeping 
divorce reform efforts, and were intended to implement a theory of 
marriage as economic partnership. I analyze why equitable distribution 
statutes have failed to create meaningful equality between partners at the 
dissolution of relationships and what factors have obstructed the full 
realization of the economic partnership ideal. Subsequently, I analyze 
the problem that equitable distribution statutes were meant to solve: 
specialization of household labor. I discuss this specialization of labor—
the marital bargain—in the traditional context of different-sex couples. I 
also draw on recent sociological literature to examine how same-sex 
couples organize household labor and whether they engage in similarly 
gendered forms of specialized labor. 
In Part II, I discuss how courts have resisted characterizing certain 
career assets as marital property, just as they have resisted equal division 
of business assets even when one spouse has made significant indirect 
contributions to the business. I discuss how professional degrees, 
enhanced earning capacity, and the valuation of spousal contributions to 
corporate enterprises remain carve-outs from the more general policy of 
using property to compensate non- or low-earning spouses. I also 
analyze how courts resist characterizing these assets as marital property 
and discuss why distribution and spousal-maintenance awards are 
inadequate solutions to the problems of asset characterization. Finally, I 
argue that courts should define enhanced earning capacity broadly and 
characterize it as marital property, and I provide models from New York 
case law that demonstrate how courts can realize the values of economic 
partnership. 
In Part III, I analyze the question of when an economic partnership 
begins. I examine how courts have addressed questions surrounding 
property division in different-sex “hybrid” relationships and propose that 
courts adopt the category of pre-marital property to address the 
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particular difficulties of hybrid relationships. I also propose a modified 
formalist framework for assessing when the counting of pre-marital 
property begins, one that recognizes autonomous decisions to remain off 
the marital grid and relies on myriad legal markers to indicate intent to 
form both a legal relationship and an economic partnership. For 
example, in the case of same-sex partners, some couples will have 
entered into domestic partnerships, or civil unions. Moreover, many 
same-sex couples have purposefully engaged in private contracting and 
estate planning, such that courts will have other evidence relating to a 
couple’s wishes about property distribution and their level of financial 
commitment to one another. These types of indicators, I argue, are legal 
markers that may indicate an economic partnership. 
Ultimately, same-sex divorce underscores the need for a 
reexamination of and recommitment to our guiding theories of marital 
property. If we are to take seriously the notion that marriage is an 
economic partnership we must look beyond the strict confines of the 
marriage license and consider the probability that economic partnerships 
begin before marriage licensing. Similarly, we must reconsider what 
counts as marital property. The solutions I propose are more responsive 
to the marital bargains that both same- and different-sex couples make 
because they take into account household specialization of labor and 
recognize spousal contributions that are currently going un- or under-
valued. These solutions will help equalize the gendered effects of 
marriage and advance the goals of divorce equality. 
I.  UNDERSTANDING THE MARITAL BARGAIN 
Most systems of property ownership are based on explicit 
understandings of resource use, allocation, and sharing. Property 
ownership within marriage is distinct because it involves agreements 
about how to pool resources, including human capital, that are largely 
tacit. Because of these norms of shared assets and shared work, disputes 
about resources and household work are common. It is not until divorce, 
however, that the ownership of household assets becomes truly 
contested. Moreover, as Lawrence Waggoner has observed, divorce 
might be considered unusual in the context of property ownership 
because the law, rather than the legal owner of the property, “makes the 
crucial allocative decision [at divorce].”15 
Traditionally, at the dissolution of a marriage, assets went to the 
                                                     
15. Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 MO. L. REV. 21, 23 
(1994). This is presuming the absence of an antenuptial agreement. 
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individual who held title to the asset, usually the husband. This common 
law approach to marital property derived from the English coverture 
framework, which gave the husband all property rights both during and 
after marriage, and disallowed most property ownership for women 
within marriage. This long-standing method of property division 
remained in place, mitigated by alimony awards, until the divorce 
reforms of the 1970s and 1980s. In this Part, I discuss the problems with 
the title-based theories of property division that led to the divorce 
reforms and the creation of the equitable distribution statutes. 
Legislatures and courts aspired, as I demonstrate, to install a new 
conception of marriage—marriage as economic partnership—through 
the enactment of these statutes. I evaluate the limited success that the 
statutes had as safeguards against economic unfairness, and 
subsequently analyze the problem that equitable distribution statutes 
were meant to solve—the perceived need to compensate wives for 
fulfilling their unpaid role as prescribed by the marital bargain. The 
conventional bargain, as it has existed between different-sex couples, is 
rooted in specialization of labor, economic dependency, and gender 
difference. I evaluate how this bargain works for different-sex couples 
and how same-sex couples may or may not be updating this marital 
bargain by de-gendering marriage. 
A.  Establishing Economic Partnership 
In the 1970s and 1980s, along with no-fault divorce, states enacted 
equitable distribution statutes (or adopted community property rules)
16
 
that ushered in a new regime of marital property division. Equitable 
distribution statutes required courts to look beyond title—as well as 
marital fault—and created the statutory categories of marital and 
separate property. Once a court determined the extent of a couple’s 
marital property—their marital estate—it then divided the marital 
property either equally or equitably, pursuant to the state statutory 
system. These statutes were seen as necessary to safeguard housewives 
against what were, for them, the detrimental consequences of divorce. 
These statutes and the judicial gloss that courts supplied framed the 
marital relationship as an economic partnership, thereby trying to 
                                                     
16. I am bracketing the discussion of community property rules and focus, in this Article, 
solely on equitable distribution states. Currently there are nine community property states: Arizona, 
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin. See 
generally William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution of American Community Property 
Law and Their Import to Equitable Distribution States, 23 FAM. L.Q. 163 (1989). 
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capture the contributions of both wage earners and homemakers. The 
focus of marital property division shifted, accordingly, away from fault 
inquiries to inquiries about spousal contributions to the marriage. In this 
section, I describe these changes in the marital property rules and their 
mixed success. 
1.  Equitable Distribution and the Divorce Revolution 
Prior to the divorce reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, states uniformly 
awarded property based on title holding at the dissolution of a marriage. 
This system derived from English common law heritage. Under rules of 
coverture, a married woman was unable to own property while married, 
with limited exceptions, and her husband controlled all of her non-trust 
property.
17
 Upon separation or divorce (which was rare and difficult to 
obtain), a husband was entitled to everything except for a wife’s real 
property and assets placed in separate trust.
18
 After the statutory 
enactments that granted married women the right to own and control 
property, the “reformed” common law approach identified “two distinct 
interests, the husband’s separate property and the wife’s separate 
property. Common ownership [was] brought into being only when one 
or both spouses elect[ed] to hold property in both names.”19 At divorce, 
all property remained with the title-holder, and the emphasis was placed 
squarely on individual earning, ownership, and investment.
20
 
                                                     
17. All “moveables” or “chattels”—which included money, clothing, jewelry, furniture, and 
other personal goods—became the property of the husband, as did any leasehold land. A wife’s 
dowry, or portion, also came under the control of her husband. A married woman retained title to 
her freehold, and in theory the husband could not dispose of it without her consent. However, a wife 
had no right to any income the property produced. AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY 
IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 103–13 (1993). Women could, however, have assets placed in trust 
for their benefit. See Allison Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the 
Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 167 (2014). For a good 
overview of the complexity of coverture, see generally MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW: 
COVERTURE IN ENGLAND AND THE COMMON LAW WORLD (Tim Stretton & Krista Kesselring eds., 
2013) [hereinafter MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW].  
18. See EILEEN SPRING, LAW, LAND, AND FAMILY: ARISTOCRATIC INHERITANCE IN 
ENGLAND 1300 TO 1800 8–66 (1993); SUSAN STAVES, MARRIED WOMEN’S SEPARATE PROPERTY IN 
ENGLAND 1660–1833 (1990); MARRIED WOMEN AND THE LAW, supra note 17; Tait, supra note 17 
(discussing traditional rules of coverture). 
19. Susan Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in California’s Community 
Property System, 1849–1975, 24 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (1976); see also Waggoner, supra note 15, at 
24.  
20. If the husband held all the property and assets in his name, courts mitigated the inequity 
through alimony awards, which were often indexed to fault. Deborah H. Bell, Equitable 
Distribution: Implementing the Marital Partnership Theory Through the Dual Classification 
System, 67 MISS. L.J. 115, 117–20 (1997). 
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By the mid-twentieth century, as divorce rates began to rise
21
 and the 
problems with fault-based divorce became clear, a range of groups—
including some feminist organizations
22—began to push for divorce 
reform. Reformers focused their efforts on the adoption of no-fault 
divorce rules, which allowed couples to divorce without proving fault 
and being forced to manufacture evidence of adultery.
23
 Equitable 
distribution statutes were related to this reform because they generally 
barred marital fault from being a consideration in property distribution.
24
 
Equitable distribution statutes were also, however, designed to address 
the problems inherent in the position of a homemaker upon divorce: “By 
the middle of the twentieth century, critics attacked the title system as 
unfair to traditional homemakers. They argued that the homemaker’s 
valuable contribution to the marital unit was completely ignored by a 
system that awarded all property to the wage-earner.”25 Those fighting to 
recognize the labor of homemakers included both feminist groups, such 
as the National Organization for Women, as well as more conservative 
constituencies, including the family law bar in many states.
26
 
The idea of equitable distribution arose in policy papers and reports as 
early as 1963. In that year’s Report of the Committee on Civil and 
Political Rights to the President’s Commission on the Status of Women, 
the report authors observed that: 
                                                     
21. See Garrison, supra note 11. 
22. See id. (arguing feminist groups focused primarily on ERA efforts but also, contrary to 
conventional story, did advocate for divorce reform). 
23. See id.; HERBERT JACOB, THE SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE 
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES (1983); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on 
Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 130, 130 (“Rather, no-fault 
divorce primarily sought to rid domestic relations law of the bad features of the old system—bitter 
recriminations, private detectives, cooperative lying about adultery, the stigma of being divorced, 
and so on.”).  
24. Martha L. Fineman, Societal Factors Affecting the Creation of Legal Rules for 
Distribution of Property at Divorce, 23 FAM. L.Q. 279, 286 (1989). There has been much discussion 
around the data in Weitzman’s book and, according to even Weitzman’s admission, some of the 
data is incorrect. However, all data confirms the general trends and outcomes that Weitzman 
identified in her book. Very few states, like North Carolina, still include fault as a factor. See 
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC 
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985). 
25. See Bell, supra note 20, at 122–23 (citations omitted). 
26. Mary Zeigler, An Incomplete Revolution: Feminists and the Legacy of Marital-Property 
Reform, 19 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 259, 261 (2013) (“By the late 1970s, NOW responded by 
campaigning for ‘pro-homemaker’ divorce reforms: measures such as those calling for equal or 
equitable distribution of marital property and laws recognizing the contributions of homemakers in 
the division of marital property.”); see also Suzanne Kahn, Chapter I: Alimony Drones, Breeding 
Cows, and Displaced Homemakers: Women Find Their Way Through the Divorce Law Revolution 
(May 2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University) (on file with author).  
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Marriage as a partnership in which each spouse makes a 
different but equally important contribution is increasingly 
recognized . . . . During marriage, each spouse should have a 
legally defined substantial right in the earnings of the other, in 
the real and personal property acquired through those earnings, 
and in their management. Such a right should be legally 
recognized as surviving the marriage in the event of its 
termination.
27
 
The Committee recommended changes to laws concerning alimony, 
support, and property settlements.
28
 
California was the first state to act on these recommendations, thanks 
in large part to the efforts of Herma Hill Kay and her associates. 
California enacted no-fault divorce in 1969, simultaneously establishing 
a community property system.
29
 California’s new divorce rules 
subsequently served as a model for the drafting of the Uniform Marriage 
and Divorce Act (UMDA), which introduced the idea of equitable 
distribution. Aligned with the idea that fault was not to be a factor in 
either granting the divorce or awarding property, the prefatory note to 
the UMDA stated that property distribution at divorce was to be treated, 
as nearly as possible, “like the distribution of assets incident to the 
dissolution of a partnership.”30 Courts were charged with distributing 
marital property “without regard to marital misconduct, in just 
proportions after considering all relevant factors.”31 The first factor was 
the “contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, 
including contribution of a spouse as homemaker.”32 
The UMDA was thereafter promulgated by the Uniform Law 
Commission in 1971 and approved by the American Bar Association, 
after much debate, in 1974.
33
 The majority of states followed 
                                                     
27. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS TO THE PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN 47 (1963). 
28. Id. at 48. 
29. See Kay, supra note 9, at 6–9 (noting California was the first state to abolish traditional 
fault-based grounds for divorce and to substitute factual finding of marriage breakdown in their 
place, and California no-fault divorce law became effective in 1970 in context of community-
property marital regime).  
30. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 177, at 4 (1973). 
31. Id. § 307. 
32. Id. Other factors included (2) value of the property set apart to each spouse; (3) duration 
of the marriage; and (4) economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property was 
to become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live 
therein for a reasonable period to the spouse having custody of any children. Id. 
33. See generally Kahn, supra note 26. 
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California’s lead and changed their divorce laws. The journey to full 
national acceptance of equitable distribution rules was, however, 
protracted; it took several decades for the majority of states to enact 
equitable distribution statutes. State by state, legislatures and family law 
bars debated the wisdom of the proposed UMDA and mostly adopted 
pieces of the model legislation without fully adopting it. By 1983, 
twenty-two states had adopted some kind of equitable distribution 
statute,
34
 and by 2014 there were forty-one equitable distribution states.
35
 
At present, all states have adopted either equitable distribution or 
community property principles, and state legislatures have entirely 
eliminated title-based systems. 
In the space of little more than two decades, then, the common law 
theory of marital property had been transformed through statutory 
reform to such a degree that equitable distribution statutes were the new 
normal. As the New Jersey Supreme Court stated in Painter v. Painter
36
: 
“Today in the laws of many other states, in words very similar to those 
found in our statute, provision is made for the fair and equitable 
distribution of marital assets in the event of divorce.”37 State courts 
charged with interpreting the parameters of equitable distribution results 
also understood the legislative charge of putting into practice the 
principle of marriage as an economic partnership. In 1974, in a leading 
early case concerning New Jersey’s equitable distribution statute, 
Rothman v. Rothman,
38
 the State Supreme Court observed: 
[The statute] gives recognition to the essential supportive role 
played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that as 
homemaker, wife and mother she should clearly be entitled to a 
share of family assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus 
the division of property upon divorce is responsive to the 
concept that marriage is a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, 
that in many ways it is akin to a partnership.
39
 
As state courts increasingly evaluated cases using equitable distribution 
                                                     
34. See Zeigler, supra note 26, at 261 (“Equitable property division, rare in 1970, became the 
norm in all but ten states by the mid-1980s. Whereas no states had property-division rules 
recognizing the contributions of homemakers in 1968, 22 states had adopted such a policy by 1983.” 
(citations omitted)). 
35. These states comprise all of the states that are not community property states. See Kay, 
supra note 9, at 6. 
36. 320 A.2d 484 (N.J. 1974). 
37. Id. at 491. 
38. 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974). 
39. Id. at 501. 
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statutes, they repeated the mantra of marriage as economic partnership.
40
 
Just over ten years after Rothman, the North Carolina Supreme Court 
remarked: 
[T]he General Assembly sought to alleviate the unfairness of the 
common law rule by enacting our Equitable Distribution 
Act . . . [which] reflects the idea that marriage is a partnership 
enterprise to which both spouses make vital contributions and 
which entitles the homemaker spouse to a share of the property 
acquired during the relationship.
41
 
Another decade later, in Mississippi, the State Supreme Court reiterated 
that marriage was a partnership enterprise in justifying the equitable 
distribution of marital assets: 
Most parties enter into marriage with no estate and proceed to 
build an estate together. Therefore, in the event of a divorce, 
there is more often than not one estate. If the breadwinner 
happens to be the husband and has all property in his name, this 
serves to relegate the non-breadwinner wife to the equivalent of 
a maid—and upon division of the marital estate entitled to a 
minimum wage credit for her homemaking service. We abandon 
such an approach. We, today, recognize that marital partners can 
be equal contributors whether or not they both are at work in the 
marketplace.
42
 
Modern marriage was an economic partnership, and modern divorce was 
the dissolution of this economic partnership. By the 1990s, these notions 
had become entrenched in legal language and culture.
43
 
                                                     
40. See, e.g., Cassiday v. Cassiday, 716 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Haw. 1986) (“These decisions are 
consistent with the time honored proposition that marriage is a partnership to which both partners 
bring their financial resources as well as their individual energies and efforts.”); Williams v. 
Williams, 354 S.E.2d 64, 66 (Va. 1987) (“The ‘equitable distribution’ statute, however, is intended 
to recognize a marriage as a partnership and to provide a means to divide equitably the wealth 
accumulated during and by that partnership based on the monetary and non-monetary contributions 
of each spouse.”); Lacey v. Lacey, 173 N.W.2d 142, 144–45 (Wis. 1970) (“The division of the 
property of the divorced parties rests upon the concept of marriage as a shared enterprise or joint 
undertaking. It is literally a partnership, although a partnership in which contributions and equities 
of the partners may and do differ from individual case to individual case.”).  
41. White v. White, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831–32 (N.C. 1985).  
42. Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994). 
43. The concept of marriage as an economic partnership has given rise to a body of literature 
comparing the marital partnership to other, corporate forms of partnership. See, e.g., Bea Ann 
Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L. REV. 689 
(1990). 
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2.  The Mixed Results of Equitable Distribution 
Despite grandiose statements from courts and legislatures about 
marriage as a partnership, equitable distribution statutes did not always 
alleviate economic inequality between spouses post-divorce. Rather, 
there was a growing consensus in the years following the adoption of 
equitable distribution rules that the new laws had not “lived up to their 
promise of providing a fair apportionment of assets between the 
parties.”44 Marsha Garrison’s leading 1991 study of how courts in three 
New York counties treated property and alimony found that new 
property distributions “failed to provide major benefits to divorced 
wives”45 and that, simultaneously, the “alimony prospects” of long-term 
homemakers were significantly reduced.
46
 Deborah Rhode and Martha 
Minow likewise observed that equitable distribution statutes actually 
produced a “[s]harp decline in single women’s standards of living 
following divorce”47 and exacerbated the “feminization of poverty.”48 
One of the major problems in implementation was the scope and 
characterization of the marital estate—in other words, what counted as 
marital property.
49
 Rhode and Minow noted: “Part of the problem lies in 
the restrictive definition of property belonging to the community . . .”50 
Garrison found, from the outset, that husbands in her sample group were 
more likely to possess separate property than their wives and 
consequently left the marriage with a higher level of assets. But the fact 
that courts characterized key non-liquid assets, such as professional 
degrees and other “career assets,”51 as separate from the marital estate 
                                                     
44. Kay, supra note 9, at 12. 
45. Garrison, supra note 11, at 739. 
46. Id. 
47. Deborah L. Rhode & Martha Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms: 
Feminist Perspectives on Divorce Law, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS, supra note 9, at 
191, 197; see also Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property 
Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2318 (1994) (“[T]he years since the enactment of the initial no-fault 
divorce reforms have made it clear that women tend to fare far worse financially as a result of 
divorce than men.”). 
48. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 197; see also MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF 
EQUALITY 38 (1991) (arguing that single-parent families headed by women are the “new poor”). 
49. Before a court values and distributes marital property, it first characterizes the property as 
either separate or marital. Property acquired before the marriage, as well as gifts or bequests 
received by one member of the couple during marriage, remain separate property. Everything else, 
generally, is marital property. 
50. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 200. 
51. Lenore Weitzman defined career assets as “a large array of specific assets such as pension 
and retirement benefits, a license to practice a profession or trade, medical and hospital insurance, 
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was even more detrimental to the goals of equitable distribution. For 
example, many states did not initially count pensions as part of the 
marital estate. New York did not do so until 1984, following Majauskas 
v. Majauskas.
52
 The Retirement Equity Act of 1984,
53
 which required 
private pension plans to comply with court orders in the context of 
divorce decrees, facilitated a nationwide shift toward including pensions 
in the marital estate.
54
 Pension assets are now uniformly included in the 
marital estate and are one of the most common forms of wealth within 
marriage. Likewise, courts that were originally vexed by how to 
characterize and value both patents and professional goodwill, other 
assets that often represent a future rather than present income stream, 
now routinely include these assets in the marital estate. 
Contrarily, almost all state courts, with the exception of New York, 
have ruled that professional degrees cannot count as marital property.
55
 
Indeed, courts almost uniformly refuse to characterize either 
professional degrees or any form of enhanced earning capacity as marital 
property. This leaves one spouse’s contributions to the other spouse’s 
education and career un- or under-valued. This undervaluation is 
problematic in both low-asset marriages, because enhanced earning 
capacity is one of the only significant assets, and in long-term marriages, 
because wives often emerge with no experience in the labor market and 
little earning potential.
56
 In addition, courts have uniformly resisted 
awarding equal percentages of family businesses or other closely held 
corporate shares to divorcing wives, even when the marriage is a long-
term one in which the wife acted as homemaker and caretaker for a 
significant period of time.
57
 
Problems characterizing the marital estate have subsequently resulted 
                                                     
the goodwill of a business, and entitlements to company goods and services,” and labeled them 
“The New Property.” See WEITZMAN, supra note 24, at 110. 
52. 463 N.E.2d 15, 17 (N.Y. 1984) (“Vested rights in a noncontributory pension plan are 
marital property to the extent that they were acquired between the date of the marriage and the 
commencement of a matrimonial action, even though the rights are unmatured at the time the action 
is begun.”). The case involved a police officer who argued that his pension was not marital property 
during the divorce proceedings. The couple owned no other property and the court awarded the wife 
“maintenance of $43 per week, to be reduced if defendant obtained employment by $1 per week for 
every $3 of her gross earnings.” Id. at 18. 
53. Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (codified in scattered 
sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
54. WEITZMAN, supra note 24, at 115. 
55. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing professional degrees as marital property).  
56. See infra Part II.A (discussing career assets as marital property). 
57. See infra Part II (for a more in-depth discussion of the problem of career assets). 
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in economic inequalities at divorce. Exacerbating these problems is the 
fact that the adoption of equitable distribution rules has rendered courts 
less likely to make substantial alimony awards. Once courts adopted the 
“equal partnership” model, the theory held that property division would 
adequately provide for both parties. “To the extent that the marriage left 
one spouse financially dependent on the other, property division, rather 
than alimony, would be used to address that dependency since property 
could be divided at the time of divorce.”58 Relatedly, alimony also 
contravened the desire of reformers to establish divorce rules that would 
facilitate a clean break between the parties.
59
 Consequently, one of 
Garrison’s major findings was a significant decrease in the frequency 
and amount of alimony awards, even in long-term marriages.
60
 Rejecting 
permanent alimony and large alimony awards, state courts focused 
primarily on rehabilitative alimony, giving the wife time-limited 
payments that allowed her to obtain additional job training or education 
in order to enter the paid labor market. Because, as Garrison also found, 
most couples had little property to divide, the decrease in alimony 
awards was an obstacle to adequately provisioning an economic 
dependent post-divorce. “[R]eformers realized that women were not 
equals in the marketplace,”61 nevertheless equitable distribution statutes 
did not always meet the challenge of equalizing parties post-divorce. 
B.  Specialized Labor and Spousal Contributions 
The primary reason that reformers sought to change the marital 
property division rules was that the old rules did not compensate wives 
who stayed at home and specialized their labor according to cultural 
norms and gender stereotypes. The original marital bargain—hammered 
out in both legal rules and the social imagination—posited the husband 
and wife existing in two distinct but complementary roles. The husband 
                                                     
58. Jana Singer, Husbands, Wives, and Human Capital: Why the Shoe Won’t Fit, 31 FAM. 
L.Q. 119, 120 (1997); see also Regan, supra note 47, at 2315 (“[M]ost states treat property division 
as the primary vehicle for financial adjustments, creating a presumption against alimony or 
maintenance that can only be rebutted by demonstrating that an equitable property division still 
leaves a spouse in dire financial condition.”). 
59. Singer, supra note 58, at 121 (“[T]he no-fault divorce philosophy appeared to absolve 
divorcing spouses of responsibility for each other’s financial well-being. As a result, facilitating a 
clean financial break replaced punishing a guilty spouse (or protecting an innocent one) as the 
overriding objective of divorce-related financial adjustments.”); see also Regan, supra note 47, at 
2316 (“Divorce law therefore now regards divorce primarily as transforming spouses into 
strangers.”). 
60. See Garrison, supra note 11, at 634. 
61. Id. at 630. 
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earned income and acted as head of household. The wife provided 
domestic services and childcare. Equitable distribution rules were 
designed to better account for this particular householding pattern. In 
this section, I discuss the specialization of household labor—the marital 
bargain—and how it has both persisted and evolved in the wake of social 
change for women and the advent of same-sex marriage. 
1.  The Original Marital Bargain: Different-Sex Couples 
The conventional marital bargain is encapsulated in the ubiquitous 
narrative of the separate spheres. In this story, women “live in a distinct 
‘world,’ engaged in nurturant activities, focused on children, husbands, 
and family dependents.”62 Men, on the other hand, participate in the 
world of the marketplace, earning income and representing the 
household in the economic and political worlds. The bargain, originally 
written into English coverture rules and domestic relations law, was that 
the husband had a duty to support his wife since social norms prevented 
her from earning income.
63
 Husbands owed their wives alimony or 
“separate maintenance” when the couple lived apart, and couples rarely 
divorced.
64
 In the modern context, specialization of labor continues to 
occur and modern economists, most famously Gary Becker, have 
explained and justified this gendered labor specialization on efficiency 
grounds.
65
 Becker has argued that “[i]ncreasing returns from specialized 
human capital is a powerful force creating a division of labor in the 
allocation of time and investments in human capital between married 
men and married women.”66 
Moreover, despite the fact that patterns of work and caretaking have 
shifted in the last decades “[a]mong heterosexual couples, within-couple 
inequalities have persisted in terms of earnings and time spent on 
household labor, even as women have been more fully integrated into 
the paid labor market.”67 And even when participating in the paid labor 
market, wives take on a larger share of housework and childcare than 
                                                     
62. Linda K. Kerber, Separate Spheres, Female Worlds, Woman’s Place: The Rhetoric of 
Women’s History, 75 J. AM. HIST. 9, 10 (1988). 
63. Class, as historians have noted, has complicated this bargain, at all times. See id. at 12. 
64. See Tait, supra note 17, at 13.  
65. Gary S. Becker, Human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of Labor, 3 J. LAB. & 
ECON. S33, S33 (1985). 
66. Id. 
67. Katherine Weisshaar, Earnings Equality and Relationship Stability for Same-Sex and 
Heterosexual Couples, 93 SOC. FORCES 93, 96 (2014); see also Alicia Brokars Kelly, Navigating 
Gender in Modern Intimate Partnership Law, 14 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 10–20 (2012). 
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their spouses.
68
 Furthermore, wives have traditionally been more willing 
to engage in part-time labor or commit themselves to underemployment 
in order to be the primary caretaker for children and to allow their 
spouses to maximize their work productivity.
69
 Even couples who strive 
to be egalitarian by dividing up earnings, chores, and carework end up 
with an unequal division of household labor in which the wife ends up 
taking on a larger share of the unseen work of household administration, 
“second shift” work.70 And while a couple may jointly benefit from 
specializing labor, the problem for women is that “housework 
responsibilities lower the earnings and affect the jobs of married women 
by reducing their time in the labor force and discouraging their 
investment in market human capital.”71 Upon divorce, wives are left 
underinvested in their human capital, and the unpaid contributions they 
have made to the success of the marital enterprise are undercompensated 
because these contributions cannot be characterized as property.
72
 
Current divorce laws fail to capture the myriad sacrifices and unpaid 
contributions that spouses, usually wives, make. In a modern context, 
one in which women are strong participants in the labor market and men 
are doing an increasing amount of caretaking, these sacrifices and 
unpaid contributions take on many forms. For some couples, marriage 
may still mean that spouses take on highly gendered roles and divide 
labor between the home and the market. One partner might forgo paid 
employment entirely to help manage the home and raise children while 
                                                     
68. See MARTHA ERTMAN, LOVE’S PROMISES 126 (2015) (“On an average day in 2012, only 
20 percent of men did housework like cleaning or laundry, compared with 48 percent of women.”). 
69. See Laura A. Rosenbury, Work Wives, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 345, 381 (2013). 
Because of the persistence of the gendering of roles, many individuals—including working 
women—say they need “wives.” What this means is that:  
[T]he speaker desires someone in her (or his) life who will pick up the dry cleaning, keep track 
of appointments, do the laundry, take the kids to soccer practice, get dinner on the table, 
manage the social calendar, and vacuum, dust, and scour the tub. In other words, the speaker 
wants someone to perform the caregiving tasks that legal wives previously were required to 
perform when marriage was a gendered hierarchy, with men at the top and women at the 
bottom.  
Id.  
70. See generally HOCHSCHILD, supra note 13 (examining division of housework and 
childcare duties among “dual-career,” opposite-sex couples); MAHONY, supra note 13. 
71. Becker, supra note 65, at S55. 
72. Deborah Widiss speculates that there is “a disconnect in a structure of marriage law that 
encourages specialization during marriage but that, upon divorce, treats such specialization as an 
individual choice for which the dependent spouse must bear the brunt of the consequences.” 
Deborah A. Widiss, Reconfiguring Sex, Gender, and the Law of Marriage, 50 FAM. CT. REV. 205, 
211 (2012).  
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her partner earns the income and invests in his career.
73
 On the opposite 
end of the spectrum, there are partnerships in which both parties are 
earners and have similar levels of education and income. These more 
egalitarian couples might share the burdens of housework and income 
generation just as they share other resources. Even in these relationships, 
however, partners bargain, make trade-offs, and distribute the work of 
running a household.
74
 Even in equal partnerships, spouses must co-
operate and negotiate as they “engage in a variety of collective projects, 
including child rearing, broader family relationships, friendships, and the 
common management of resources—a household, investments, and 
careers.”75 
In addition, many marriages go through periods when one spouse 
takes a career break, makes a career transition or goes through any other 
prolonged period of nonearning.
76
 In some marriages, one partner might 
take on the role of earner while the other obtains additional education, 
starts a new career venture, or looks for work in a bad economy. 
Alternatively, one partner may take a job with excellent compensation 
that allows the other to work in a personally meaningful but not highly 
paid job. Or, one partner may take a lower paying job or forgo career 
opportunities in order to allow the other partner to make critical career 
moves and relocate. These choices are sometimes reciprocal and, at 
various points in a partnership, individuals may switch roles, such that 
both partners have the chance to take risks and explore new career 
opportunities. As Milton Regan has observed: “Members of [a] 
partnership make a host of subtle contributions and sacrifices in reliance 
                                                     
73. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2320 (“Seen as an economic partnership, marriage often 
reflects a joint effort to enhance the human capital of one spouse as part of a strategy to maximize 
total household income.”). Therefore, despite the need and desire of some women to participate 
fully in the paid labor force, the fact that they have lower paying jobs sometimes enables couples to 
rationalize devoting the marital resources to supporting the husband in his career rather than the 
wife. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 41, 44 (2d ed. 1993); Margaret Brining, 
Property Distribution Physics: The Talisman of Time and Middle Class Law, 31 FAM. L.Q. 93, 
103–04 (1997).  
74. Even couples without children must allocate “admin.” See Elizabeth F. Emens, Admin, 
104 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2015). See generally MAHONY, supra note 13, for more on the ways 
couples bargain. 
75. Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 82 
(2004).  
76. In a modern context, it is also less likely that families can afford to have one partner out of 
the paid workforce. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Whither/Wither Alimony?, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
925, 927 (2015) (“We believe that it is entirely plausible that most couples today enter marriage 
believing that neither will or should assume a full-time caretaking role and that even if a spouse 
does, he or she must be prepared to resume paid employment in fairly short order in accordance 
with the family’s needs.”). 
08 - Tait.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
1266 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1245 
 
on continuation of a shared life together.”77 
In addition, children generate and intensify issues of career sacrifice 
and underemployment. Childcare makes demands of a couple that are 
unique and, when children arrive, spouses are more likely to engage in 
specialization of labor such that one person is the primary caretaker and 
one the primary economic earner.
78
 Some primary caretakers may still 
work, but forgo career opportunities that would necessitate long hours or 
significant travel in order to be available and at home. These individuals 
may choose various forms of contingent labor, part-time work, or other 
forms of the “mommy track.”79 Moreover, even individuals who choose 
to forgo paid employment for only a brief period while the children are 
very young sacrifice prime years in the paid labor market and often find 
themselves on career “off-ramps” that can be overcome only with great 
effort.
80
 Consequently, “the responsibility of married women for child 
care and other housework has major implications for earnings and 
occupational differences between men and women even aside from the 
effect on the labor force participation of married women.”81 
Ultimately, spouses bargain with one another in multiple ways as they 
navigate the difficulties of developing two careers, caretaking for 
children and sometimes parents, and maintaining a home.
82
 This 
bargaining involves navigating gender roles—perhaps introducing 
gender deviance into the equation by allocating responsibilities in 
nontraditional ways—as well as earning capacities, work preferences, 
and household needs.
83
 Spouses are sometimes very explicit about the 
                                                     
77. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2387. 
78. BECKER, supra note 73, at 37–38; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of the Allocation of Time, 75 
ECON. J. 493, 512 (1991). 
79. See, e.g., Rebecca Korzec, Working on the Mommy-Track: Motherhood and Women 
Lawyers, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 117 (1997); Elizabeth Ty Wilde et al., The Mommy Track 
Divides: The Impact of Childbearing on Wages of Women of Differing Skill Levels (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16582, 2010), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16582.  
80. See generally SYLVIA ANN HEWITT, CREATING A LIFE: PROFESSIONAL WOMEN AND THE 
QUEST FOR CHILDREN (2002). See also ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE 
MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE LEAST VALUED (1st ed., 2001); Williams, supra 
note 6. 
81. Becker, supra note 65, at S55. 
82. See MAHONY, supra note 13, for examples of how spouses negotiate. 
83. See Kelly, supra note 67, at 31–33. Different-sex couples may engage in gender “deviant” 
behavior in which they test, stretch, and reverse gender roles. When men engage in caretaking, 
however, they often encounter the same concerns and obstacles as women do. See Joan C. Williams 
& Allison Tait, Mancession or “Momcession”?: Good Providers, a Bad Economy, and Gender 
Discrimination, 86 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 857, 865 (2011). 
08 - Tait.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
2015] DIVORCE EQUALITY 1267 
 
terms of their economic partnerships, discussing how to divide their time 
in order to meet family needs. Other times, individuals sink into certain 
roles through trial and error, without much discussion, finally settling on 
a pattern that works. In both cases, individuals usually make these 
sacrifices operating on the unspoken understanding that they will be both 
provisioned and protected by their marital status. 
At divorce, not all bargains will or should cause judicial concern. 
Some sacrifice is endemic to the state of marriage. There are the daily 
bargains—the work of sharing—that marriages are built on, and these 
series of small sacrifices do not necessarily demand accounting at the 
moment of property division. Moreover, marriage should not be a ledger 
of debits and credits that spouses calculate and recalculate daily. 
Nonetheless, certain marital bargains in which economic dependency 
exists alongside sacrifice of income and opportunity are a cause for 
judicial concern. Certain marital bargains that depend on labor 
specialization, and that are enriched by the unpaid contributions of one 
spouse—these are the divorces in which marital property must be 
reimagined in order to reflect the bargains made by partners during the 
intact marriage.
84
 
2.  Updating the Marital Bargain: Same-Sex Couples 
Marriage has conventionally been a foundational site for the creation 
of gender and the marital bargain has been the template for shaping 
gender. More recently, same-sex marriage has been celebrated as an 
evolutionary event in the history of marriage that will help decrease the 
persistence of gender-role typecasting and specialized labor within 
marriage.
85
 Nan Hunter has observed that same-sex couples differ from 
different-sex couples in important ways with respect to “household 
labor, sexual exclusivity, and child rearing,” all of which have been 
traditionally “associated with the legal definition of marriage.”86 Some 
scholars have suggested that same-sex marriage has the potential to 
provide a new model for marriage by creating marriages that are “empty 
of gendering processes and practices,” as opposed to different-sex 
                                                     
84. In addition, as Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser have demonstrated, “rules and 
procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs between 
divorcing couples outside the courtroom.” Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in 
the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (emphasis in original). 
85. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 3, at 18–19. 
86. Nan D. Hunter, Introduction: The Future Impact of Same-Sex Marriage: More Questions 
than Answers, 100 GEO. L.J. 1855, 1865 (2012). 
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marriages that are “gender-full.”87 
In support of this theory, a number of studies have shown that, in 
terms of labor specialization, same-sex couples adopt a more egalitarian 
approach: “Much research on same-sex domesticity points to a strong 
egalitarian ideal for division of labour, a reluctance for one spouse to be 
dependent on the other, and an emphasis on negotiation.”88 Instead of 
allocating household labor by gender (wife cooks dinner, husband takes 
out the trash), “most couples in same-sex relationships do not assign 
gender roles. The tasks are flexible, often interchangeable between the 
partners and are often divided by time, ability, and consideration.”89 This 
egalitarian concept of domestic labor and marital bargaining correlates 
with the fact that “most gay men and lesbians are in dual-earner 
relationships, so neither partner is the exclusive breadwinner and each 
partner has some measure of economic independence.”90 
Nonetheless, studies also show that same-sex couples still adopt 
default patterns of specialized labor within the household, even while 
preferring a narrative of equality within marriage. One leading study 
from the 1990s found that, in seventy-five percent of same-sex 
relationships, one member of the couple “specialize[d] in domesticity.”91 
This tendency to specialize, as with different-sex marriages, increased 
with the length of the relationship. Therefore, in opposition to the stated 
desire for and engagement in equal relationships, “some same-sex 
couples were observed to be enacting a fairly segregated, or specialized, 
division of labor, whereby one partner concentrated more of his or her 
energies in domestic work and one partner was more heavily involved in 
                                                     
87. Abbie E. Goldberg, “Doing” and “Undoing” Gender: The Meaning and Division of 
Housework in Same-Sex Couples, 5 J. FAM. THEORY & REV. 85, 88 (2013). 
88. Robert Leckey, Marriage and the Data on Same-Sex Couples, 35 J. SOC. WELFARE & 
FAM. L. 179, 182 (2013); see also Charlotte Patterson, Family Lives of Lesbian and Gay Adults, in 
HANDBOOK OF MARRIAGE AND THE FAMILY 659, 661 (Gary W. Peterson & Kevin R. Bush eds., 3d 
ed. 2013) (“Lesbian and gay couples report that egalitarian ways of dividing up labor are the most 
common.”); Goldberg, supra note 87, at 87 (“This literature is consistent in suggesting that same-
sex couples divide housework more equally than heterosexual couples.”). Suzanne Kim’s work on 
name changes within same-sex marriage also bears out the importance of the equality norm for 
same-sex couples. See Suzanne Kim, Social Rites of Marriage (2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
89. Suzanne Taylor Sutphin, Social Exchange Theory and the Division of Household Labor in 
Same-Sex Couples, 46 MARRIAGE & FAM. REV. 191, 195 (2010). 
90. Letitia Anne Peplau & Adam W. Fingerhut, The Close Relationships of Lesbians and Gay 
Men, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 405, 408 (2007). 
91. CARRINGTON, NO PLACE LIKE HOME: RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILY LIFE AMONG 
LESBIANS AND GAY MEN 187 (1999). 
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the paid employment sphere.”92 Similar to egalitarian-minded different-
sex couples, same-sex couples generally appear held to a vision of 
equality within marriage that may “mask substantial observable 
differences between partners’ actual contributions.”93 
These findings, that same-sex couples specialize labor, dovetail with 
related studies that posit specialization of labor according to social 
exchange theory. Social exchange theory “predicts that greater power 
accrues to the partner who has relatively greater personal resources, such 
as education, money, or social standing.”94 This prediction has proved 
true with both different- and same-sex couples.
95
 In the context of same-
sex relationships, studies have found that “older, wealthier men 
generally had more power in their intimate relationships” and that “the 
partner with greater financial resources had more power in money 
management issues” in gay but not lesbian couples.96 Gay men, like their 
straight counterparts, tend to believe that “the more successful partner 
should not have to participate in household labor. It was a form of ‘extra 
credit’ if the more successful partner did housework.”97 More generally, 
findings show that “[w]hen differences in proportional contributions to 
housework occur in same-sex couples, the partner with less job prestige, 
less income, or greater job flexibility tends to perform a greater 
proportion of unpaid work.”98 Approaching the question from the other 
side, studies have found sharing of household labor in same-sex couples 
to be “most common among affluent couples who relied on paid help, 
and when both partners had less demanding jobs with more flexible 
schedules.”99 
Children, moreover, complicate the division of labor in a household. 
Parenting in different-sex couples is a strong driver of labor 
specialization and the gendering of carework. This also holds true for 
different-sex couples raising children, a demographic that is swiftly 
increasing. A sizeable number of same-sex couples are raising or will 
raise children as adoption laws, reproductive technologies, and social 
                                                     
92. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 89. 
93. Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 90, at 408.  
94. Id. at 409. 
95. Id.; see also Becker, supra note 78. 
96. Patterson, supra note 88, at 661. 
97. Sutphin, supra note 89, at 196. 
98. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 88 (citations omitted).  
99. Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 90, at 408. 
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norms shift.
100
 An estimated thirty-four percent of lesbian couples and 
twenty-two percent of gay male couples living together are already 
raising children, according to census data.
101
 As the number of children 
living in same-sex households increases, so will the number of same-sex 
couples who must “master new tasks, cope with new demands on their 
time, and deal with role transitions of various kinds.”102 
Already, Martha Ertman notes, “[o]ne in three gay male couples 
raising kids have one parent at home full-time, the same rate as straight 
couples with kids. Lesbians lag behind with one in four having one 
parent engaged in full-time homemaking.”103 Another study from 2011 
found that the majority of a sample group of lesbian parents “divided 
paid labor unequally (e.g., one partner worked full-time and one partner 
worked part-time), which often led to inequalities in the division of 
unpaid labor.”104 Increasingly, then, “among the gay and lesbian couples 
that have children, rates of stark specialization . . . are comparable to the 
rates among heterosexual parents.”105 Qualitative data likewise indicates 
the possibility of strong gendering being reinscribed through parenting. 
One study subject, a gay father raising two adoptive children with his 
partner, remarked: 
[I’m] in charge of the childcare, I’m the mom basically. I have 
definitely taken on the role of the mother at home . . . in some 
ways we kind of entered into the situation with that 
understanding . . . he even said before we had kids like, “well 
you have to be the mommy” kind of thing, like, he didn’t want 
to be, he wanted me to be the nurturer.
106
 
As Ramona Oswald has stated: “[B]eing lesbian or gay is not in itself 
                                                     
100. In 2010, approximately 16,000 same-sex couples had an adopted child, reflecting a 
significant increase from 2000, when 6477 same-sex couples had adopted children. GARY J. GATES, 
WILLIAMS INST., LGBT PARENTING IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2013), available at 
http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf. Same-sex couples 
are six times more likely than their different-sex counterparts to be raising foster children. Id. 
Overall, more than 125,000 same-sex couple households, almost twenty percent of all same-sex 
couple households, include nearly 220,000 children under the age of eighteen. Id. at 2–3. 
101. Peplau & Fingerhut, supra note 90, at 414. 
102. Patterson, supra note 88, at 666. 
103. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 128. The fact that lesbians tend to specialize labor less may 
suggest a greater commitment to relationship equality.  
104. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 89. 
105. Martha Ertman, Marital Contracting in a Post-Windsor World, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
479, 506 (2014). 
106. Ramona Faith Oswald et al., Queering “The Family,” in HANDBOOK OF FEMINIST 
FAMILY STUDIES 43, 45 (2009) (alterations in original). 
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enough to transcend heteronormativity.”107 
As with different-sex couples, there are a number of factors that 
produce and maintain power as well as gender in a same-sex marriage. 
Nan Hunter includes among the factors: “the presence of children, the 
power dynamics related to being the sole biological parent in a couple, 
income differences between partners, the length of the relationship, 
women’s experience of and commitment to employment outside the 
home, and the strength of individual desire to conform to gender 
expectations.”108 Furthermore, the way that same-sex couples navigate 
the household economy should not be automatically “mapped onto the 
heterosexual ‘template,’ in which economic providing and domestic 
activities are presumed to have identical meanings and dynamics as in 
heterosexual couples.”109 
Nevertheless, the reality is that both earnings and gender have a 
tenacious hold on intimate ordering in marriage because of the ways in 
which couples create marital bargains and differentially value individual 
contributions. Same-sex couples make the same type of marital bargains 
that different-sex couples do. Same-sex spouses bargain over who will 
do what housework, in other words, the routine chores that comprise the 
maintenance of a household and a shared life. Likewise, same-sex 
spouses experience the same spectrum of economic bargaining positions: 
Some individuals make career sacrifices so that their partners can take 
on new responsibilities, some experience periods of economic 
dependency while obtaining education or while job searching, and yet 
others take on the role of provider either by inclination or for practical 
reasons. 
One key point of traction in sociological findings is that “unequal 
incomes within a couple make it ‘incredibly difficult to resist those 
patterns of dominance’ that cohere around the role and status afforded 
the higher earner.”110 Unequal incomes correlate with (and potentially 
produce) labor specialization and have traditionally been a hallmark of 
marriage as well as gender definition within the household. A second 
key idea is that marriage encourages spouses to specialize labor by 
                                                     
107. Id. I leave to the side in this paper the question of whether the heternormative frame is 
normatively problematic for same-sex relationships and whether same-sex couples should be 
pushing against this frame. Instead, I focus on how to change divorce rules to accommodate both 
same-sex and different-sex couples who are regulated by rules that encourage sharing and labor 
specialization on entry and then penalize this behavior upon exit. 
108. Hunter, supra note 86, at 1866. 
109. Goldberg, supra note 87, at 92–93. 
110. Leckey, supra note 88, at 182 (citations omitted). 
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holding out the legal promise of financial protection if divorce occurs. 
For this reason, presumably, studies reveal that different-sex cohabiting 
partners specialize labor at a much lower rate than different-sex married 
partners: “[M]arried couples are noticeably different from all other 
household types,” and the “division of household labor is . . . more 
egalitarian in different sex cohabiting couples than in different-sex 
married couples.”111 Consequently, it is possible that same-sex marriage 
will not transform marriage; rather, marriage may transform same-sex 
couples.
112
 If same-sex couples assign and perform household work 
according to either financial earnings or conventional gender lines, 
gender stereotypes will continue to inscribe themselves in marriage. If 
courts persistently fail to capture unpaid contributions when dividing 
marital property, gender will likewise continue to inhere in marriage, to 
the detriment of the feminized party upon divorce. Equitable distribution 
rules must evolve to better reflect marital bargains, capturing specialized 
labor and economic partnership in particular, thereby increasing the 
potential to rewrite gender norms in marriage for everyone. 
II.  LEARNING TO DIVIDE THE DOMESTIC DOLLAR 
Equitable distribution statutes have the potential to redress gendered 
imbalances in both same- and different-sex marriages caused by unequal 
division of household labor and market participation during marriage. To 
achieve this goal, courts have construed the category of marital property 
expansively. For example, the Maryland Supreme Court has stated: “Our 
cases have generally construed the word ‘property’ broadly, defining it 
as a term of wide and comprehensive signification embracing everything 
which has exchangeable value or goes to make up a man’s wealth—
every interest or estate which the law regards of sufficient value for 
judicial recognition.”113 While the trend among courts has indeed been to 
include an increasing number of assets within the marital estate, the 
problem of career assets—in particular, one spouse’s contributions to 
another’s career—continues to hamper the success of these statutes. 
In this Part, I discuss the continued exemption of certain career assets 
from inclusion in the marital estate or, if included, from the presumption 
                                                     
111. Hunter, supra note 86, at 1866. 
112. See, e.g., Suzanne Goldberg, Why Marriage, in MARRIAGE AT THE CROSSROADS 
(Marsha Garrison & Elizabeth Scott eds., 2012); Ettelbrick, supra note 3, at 1; see also Polikoff, 
supra note 3, at 1546 (“[A]n effort to legalize lesbian and gay marriage would make a public 
critique of the institution of marriage impossible.”). 
113. Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (Md. 1985) (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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of equal division. I begin by describing the ways in which courts fail to 
properly compensate spousal contributions made by a non- or low-
earning spouse to the high-earning spouse’s career success. I discuss 
why courts have exempted these assets from the marital estate and from 
equal division. As compensatory mechanisms, courts have used 
distribution and support. I argue, however, that both of these strategies 
are inadequate as well as theoretically misguided. I ultimately evaluate 
judicial models for transforming career assets into marital property that 
is subject to equal division, and propose further modifications to divorce 
rules. 
A.  Questioning the Career Asset Carve-Outs 
Lenore Weitzman, in The Divorce Revolution, defined career assets as 
“tangible and intangible assets that are acquired as a part of either 
spouse’s career or career potential . . . . [These assets include] pension 
and retirement benefits, a license to practice a profession or trade, 
medical and hospital insurance, the goodwill of a business, and 
entitlements to company goods and services.”114 Career assets are key 
marital assets because, for the majority of divorcing couples, whether 
same- or different-sex, these assets are a primary source of wealth.
115
 
Professional training, advanced education, and earning capacity are 
extremely valuable “in our modern, knowledge-based 
economy . . . [where] human capital is the most important form of 
wealth produced during most marriages.”116 The failure to include 
enhanced earning capacity in the marital estate means therefore that, in 
different-sex marriages, “most wives are cut off from property rights in 
the key family asset—the wage of the ideal worker,”117 and “women’s 
per capita income and standard of living tend to decline substantially 
following divorce while those of men tend to increase.”118 The problem, 
however, is not limited to women because it is, at root, one of gender 
and earning power. The failure of courts to capture unpaid spousal 
contributions will also impact men in different-sex marriages who 
choose the role of “wife,” just as it will affect any same-sex couples who 
                                                     
114. WEITZMAN, supra note 24, at 110. 
115. In the majority of divorces, there is little property to divide. Couples likely own a home 
and participate in a pension plan; in fact, they are more likely to own debt than assets at the 
termination of a marriage. Garrison, supra note 11, at 667.  
116. Singer, supra note 59; see also Kelly, supra note 12, at 163–65. 
117. Williams, supra note 6, at 2236. 
118. Garrison, supra note 11, at 633. In addition, contrary to the stated goals of equitable 
distribution, the burden falls the hardest on women exiting long-term marriages. Id. at 739. 
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choose to specialize in household labor. 
1.  The Last Citadel: Professional Degrees and Family Businesses 
Courts have included career assets as marital property gradually and 
in piecemeal fashion. Despite valuation difficulties, states now include 
pensions as part of the marital estate. Courts may also include patents 
and some other illiquid future income streams.
119
 Courts generally 
include professional or “enterprise” goodwill in marital property, 
although there are some holdout states that refuse to do so.
120
 Courts 
have, however, routinely refused to characterize professional degrees 
and enhanced earning capacity as marital property. In addition, courts 
have persistently undervalued the contribution of non-owning spouses to 
increases in value to family businesses and other corporate shares. These 
assets and contributions remain problematic carve-outs to the 
presumption (or mandate) of equal division of marital property. 
Professional Degrees. The conventional and even cliché story of 
professional degrees and enhanced earning capacity is a familiar one. 
Wives take any available job in order to scrape together money to pay 
for household and sometimes even tuition for the husband while he is in 
school. Then, when the husband finishes school and embarks on a new 
career, he leaves the wife. The West Virginia Supreme Court described 
the typical situation in Hoak v. Hoak
121
: “The supporting 
spouse . . . made personal financial sacrifices and consented to a lower 
standard of living than she would have enjoyed had her husband been 
employed. She postponed her own career plans and presumably 
overlooked many current needs for the prospect of future material 
benefits.”122 While this narrative may sound dated to some, educational 
attainment and professional degrees remain valuable assets as the 
                                                     
119. See Majauskas v. Majauskas, 463 N.E.2d 15, 17 (N.Y. 1984). 
120. Professional goodwill, like a professional degree, is a career asset that courts have 
debated extensively because it contains elements of personal achievement. With goodwill, however, 
courts have found a way to differentiate between personal and enterprise goodwill and generally 
have been willing to allow professional goodwill to be characterized as marital property. In a survey 
of jurisdictions discussed in May v. May, 589 S.E.2d 536 (W. Va. 2003), the West Virginia Court 
found that thirteen courts made no distinction between personal and enterprise goodwill, counting 
them both in calculations of marital property and dividing them. Five courts counted neither as 
marital property. Constituting the plurality, twenty-four states differentiated between enterprise and 
personal goodwill, and counted enterprise goodwill as marital property. See id. at 543. 
121. 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988) 
122. Id. at 477 (“The appellant’s sacrifices would have been rewarded had the marriage 
endured. The divorce has left Rebecca Hoak at a substantial disadvantage when compared with her 
ex-husband.”). 
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workplace evolves and the needs of the labor market change. Advanced 
education has become almost a requirement in some areas for career 
advancement, and many couples agree that they will jointly make 
sacrifices at some point in their marriage to further the education of one 
partner. Accordingly, the legal questions persist even though gender 
roles are evolving and two earner families are more the norm than at any 
time in the past. Despite the importance and ubiquity of educational 
attainment, courts almost uniformly refuse to count professional degrees 
or any enhanced earning capacity as marital property. As Hanoch Dagan 
and Carolyn Frantz observe: “Perhaps the most common objection to 
division of earning capacity on divorce is that it is not property.”123 In a 
statement typical of courts around the country, the Colorado Supreme 
Court set forth this common objection: 
An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of 
previous education, combined with diligence and hard work. It 
may not be acquired by the mere expenditure of money. It is 
simply an intellectual achievement that may potentially assist in 
the future acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the 
attributes of property in the usual sense of that term.
124
 
Courts focus on the need for property to be heritable or at least 
marketable—to conform to a classic model of property ownership. 
Nonetheless, as Joan Williams has observed: “Many modern property 
rights also clash with a model of absolute, alienable, inheritable, and 
exchangeable entitlements. Examples are pensions and goodwill which 
are widely recognized as property despite their lack of heritability.”125 
Other forms of property, from life estates to partnership rights, are 
likewise inalienable yet recognized as property. What courts do not 
recognize is that “future earning capacity is not just a personal attribute: 
It is an income-generating asset . . . capable of treatment as property.”126 
Moreover, “engaging in an essentialist inquiry into the nature of 
                                                     
123. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109; see also Williams, supra note 6, at 2268 
(“Courts, with few exceptions, have rejected wives’ claims that the degrees are marital property, 
often using broad language to the effect that human capital does not have the attributes traditionally 
associated with property.”). 
124. In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 679 (Colo. 1987) (citing In re Marriage of 
Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978)). “While pension rights, as in Deering, constitute a current 
asset which the individual has a contractual right to receive, such rights are plainly 
distinguishable from a mere expectancy of future enhanced income resulting from a professional 
degree. The latter is but an intellectual attainment; it is not a present property interest.” Archer v. 
Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079–80 (Md. 1985). 
125. See Williams, supra note 6, at 2271. 
126. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109. 
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property simply masks the inherent normative choices” to reward 
earning and devalue unpaid, underpaid, and household labor.
127
 
Another persistent argument against making a degree or enhanced 
earning capacity marital property is that the valuation of these assets is 
too difficult and speculative. The Maryland Supreme Court, refusing to 
characterize a professional degree as marital property, stated: “At best, it 
represents a potential for increase in a person’s earning capacity made 
possible by the degree and license in combination with innumerable 
other factors and conditions too uncertain and speculative to constitute 
‘marital property’ within the contemplation of the legislature.”128 These 
arguments confuse property characterization with property valuation. 
That is to say, difficulties that arise in valuing a professional degree 
should not drive the characterization of the degree, but rather should be 
taken up in the valuation stage of property division. Furthermore, even 
acknowledging that valuation for degrees is complicated, it is clear that 
courts have methods and options at their disposal. Courts routinely find 
the value of other future income streams, such as pensions. Furthermore, 
courts have adopted an “if and when” approach in the valuation of 
patents, a method that might be particularly apt for degrees because of 
the speculative and variable nature of future income. 
Finally, one of the most resonant sets of arguments derives from the 
notion of personal merit. Courts, guided by culturally entrenched notions 
of individual accomplishment, are reticent to attribute the professional 
achievements of one spouse to the partnership unit.
129
 Success in the 
professional world is perceived as “a constitutive component of the 
individual self”130 and the normative argument against it “arise[s] from 
autonomy.”131 In addition, approaching the question from an autonomy 
standpoint, critics have argued that making these career assets part of the 
marital estate would consign the earner to a specific job and salary level, 
                                                     
127. Id. 
128. Archer, 493 A.2d at 1080; see also Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 
1982) (“Valuing a professional degree in the hands of any particular individual at the start of his 
or her career would involve a gamut of calculations that reduces to little more than guesswork.”). 
129. Regan, supra note 47, at 2355 (“The resulting visceral sense that the husband’s income 
is property earned by the sweat of his brow thus may lead a court to regard a claim on post-divorce 
income as a request for redistribution of property from one who has labored in the market to one 
who has not.”). 
130. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109. This derived from a Lockean notion of labor and 
property. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2350 (“Labor desert theory, the idea that property rights are 
justified as a reward for the expenditure of one’s labor, is perhaps ‘the principal normative theory of 
property.’”). 
131. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 109.  
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thereby removing the option for career changes that reduced the earner’s 
income. Even feminist critics note that we should be “wary of the idea 
that one person could have an ownership interest in the person of 
another. Indeed, the history of marriage law itself cautions against giving 
spouses property interests in each other’s person.”132 For all these 
reasons, courts have refused to count professional degrees as marital 
property. 
Family Businesses. Under the right conditions, an increase in value to 
a family business or other corporate shares is marital property. If the 
business shares were acquired during marriage, then they are generally 
always characterized as marital property. The problem then becomes not 
how to characterize the property but rather what percentage of the 
property to award to the contributing (non-owner) spouse. Even if the 
shares were acquired by one party before the marriage, and would 
therefore generally count as separate property, any increase to the shares 
produced through a couple’s joint labor is considered marital property. 
What courts require is a nexus between the increase in value and the 
contributions of a spouse,
133
 and if the court fails to find the nexus, 
appreciation is deemed to be passive and the asset remains separate 
property. The concept underlying this conversion of separate property 
into marital property is that one spouse should not be unjustly enriched 
by the contributions of the other. 
When spouses directly contribute and the value that they add to a joint 
enterprise is measurable—when, for instance, a spouse is an employee of 
the company and works directly for the benefit of the company—courts 
routinely award a percentage of the increase in value to the non-owning 
spouse. Even if the spousal contribution is indirect, however, courts are 
supposed to take spousal contributions into account. A New York court 
stated in Brennan v. Brennan
134
: 
[M]arriage is an economic partnership, the success of which is 
dependent not only upon the respective financial contributions 
of the partners, but also on a wide range of nonremunerated 
services to the joint enterprise, such as homemaking, raising 
children and providing the emotional and moral support 
                                                     
132. Singer, supra note 58, at 124. 
133. Professional goodwill is treated similarly, in that it is generally characterized as marital 
property, subject to equitable division, and courts look for a nexus or demonstration of spousal 
contribution in order to determine the correct division. See, e.g., Gaskill v. Robbins, 282 S.W.3d 
306 (Ky. 2009) (requiring trial court to differentiate between personal and enterprise goodwill in 
valuing wife’s oral surgery practice). 
134. 479 N.Y.S.2d 877 (App. Div. 1984). 
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necessary to sustain the other spouse in coping with the 
vicissitudes of life outside the home.
135
 
In this way, courts have understood that the equitable distribution 
statutes are meant to capture the unpaid labor produced by the non-
earning spouse. 
Accordingly, in Brennan, a case about what percentage of a 
husband’s dairy farm would go to the wife at the time of the divorce, the 
trial court was obliged to calculate what percentage of the increase in 
value to the dairy farm was attributable to the wife, in order to make the 
property award. The court observed that “[p]rosperity and growth” in the 
dairy business occurred during the marriage, in no small part because the 
wife “pledged her personal credit for its debts and contributed indirectly 
to its success through her services as a homemaker and mother.”136 Not 
including the increase in value in the marital estate, the court stated, 
would “violate the letter and spirit of the Equitable Distribution Law.”137 
Following Brennan, in Price v. Price,
138
 a 1986 case about the 
appreciated value of one spouse’s stove business,139 the court reiterated 
that an increase in company value was marital property even if one 
partner’s contributions were indirect, further concluding that there was 
no requirement for a contributing spouse to prove a causal link between 
contribution and increase in value.
140
 
Despite these precedent-setting cases, courts have nevertheless 
created a presumption against equal division in these cases.
141
 In 
Arvantides v. Arvantides,
142
 a New York case decided one year after 
Brennan, the appellate court remarked: “Although plaintiff’s 
contributions as a homemaker are indeed worthy of full 
                                                     
135. Id. at 880. 
136. Id. at 880–81. The husband was entitled to credit for the “value of his initial capital 
contribution to the spousal enterprise consisting of his premarital cattle and equipment.” Id. at 881. 
137. Id. 
138. 503 N.E.2d 684 (N.Y. 1986). 
139. At stake was the increase in value to defendant’s ownership interest in the Unity Stove 
Company (Unity), a family business engaged in the wholesale supply of kitchen parts and 
appliances. Id. at 685. 
140. Id. at 687. 
141. Legal procedure also places the contributing spouse at a distinct disadvantage since, in 
most states, the non-earning spouse bears the burden of proving her contributions. The task of 
proving an increase in value is difficult when valuation methods conflict. In addition, the 
contributing spouse may not have access to all the documentary evidence—held by the other 
spouse—needed in order to prove the increase. Proving contributions may be similarly difficult, 
especially when the contributions are indirect and consist of the daily work of maintaining a home 
and family.  
142. 478 N.E.2d 199 (N.Y. 1985). 
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consideration . . . there is no requirement that the distribution of each 
item of marital property be on an equal or 50–50 basis.”143 The court 
thereafter reduced the wife’s award in her husband’s dental practice 
from fifty to twenty-five percent, citing the “modest nature”144 of her 
contributions without actually discussing what the wife’s contributions 
were. In Capasso v. Capasso,
145
 several years later, a New York court 
awarded the wife only twenty percent of the two million dollar increase 
in value to the construction business started and run by the husband.
146
 
The court awarded this low percentage despite the fact that the wife had 
“immersed herself in [the business], dedicating herself to and identifying 
with the husband’s success.”147 She had “contributed directly and 
significantly to [the company’s] success”148 by making room for the 
business operations office in their home, doing paperwork and 
“legwork”149 for the company, and routinely discussing “business 
matters”150 with her husband. She consulted with the accountant 
regarding company business and she regularly entertained her husband’s 
customers and colleagues. She also raised the children and managed the 
housework, freeing her husband’s time for his business. The husband, 
for his part, contended only that his wife’s services were not 
“extraordinary,” “unusual,” or “significant.”151 
This trend to downplay spousal contributions, both direct and indirect, 
to the increase in value of a family business has continued almost 
without interruption.
152
 In 2013, in Mississippi, an appellate court 
affirmed the Chancellor’s ruling that interest in two grocery stores 
owned by a husband was separate property because “any contribution to 
these two grocery stores by [the wife] was minimal at best, and there 
was no increase in value during the marriage that was attributable to [the 
                                                     
143. Id. at 200 (internal citations omitted). 
144. Id.  
145. 517 N.Y.S.2d 952 (App. Div. 1987). 
146. Id. at 963. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Id. For similar results with reversed gendering, see Teitler v. Teitler, 549 N.Y.S.2d 13, 
14 (App. Div. 1989). The court awarded the wife seventy-five percent of the increase in value to her 
art business because “her efforts were considerably more instrumental in its operation and success 
than were the administrative and sales services performed by plaintiff, who was eventually replaced 
by a part-time employee.” Id. 
152. For the exception to this rule, see the discussion of Sykes v. Sykes, infra Part II.B.2. 
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wife].”153 Although the wife had worked occasionally in the floral 
department at one of the stores, the court discounted this involvement 
and failed to even mention her work within the home.
154
 
These types of work patterns and spousal contributions also define 
some same-sex households and will, in the absence of rule reform, cause 
similar inequities. An important recent cohabitant property rights case in 
Illinois, Blumenthal v. Brewer,
155
 provides a preview of the problems of 
one spouse contributing to the other’s business success and the wealth 
imbalances caused by the specialization of labor in a same-sex 
household. In that case, two women had been in a marital-like 
relationship for twenty-six years before the relationship dissolved. The 
two women met at graduate school, “exchanged rings as symbols of their 
lifelong commitment to each other,”156 and presented themselves to their 
families and friends as a committed couple. One woman—Brewer—
obtained a law degree, the other—Blumenthal—a medical degree. The 
couple had three biological children through Assisted Reproductive 
Technology and the couple deliberately allocated “work and family” 
responsibilities such that the lawyer “stayed home for a while as the 
children’s primary caregiver and then pursued employment in the public 
sector where she had regular work hours and no travel requirements.”157 
The lawyer, as the stay-at-home parent, took care of all household 
management chores and “[t]his arrangement enabled [the doctor] to 
devote time to her medical career and become the family’s primary 
breadwinner.”158 
When the relationship ended, Blumenthal requested partition of the 
house that the couple owned jointly. Brewer filed a counterclaim, 
requesting “to receive sole title to the property so that the couple’s 
overall assets would be equalized after she stayed at home with the 
couple’s three children while Blumenthal was the family’s 
breadwinner.”159 More specifically, Brewer requested that a constructive 
trust be imposed over the residence “to prevent unjust enrichment arising 
                                                     
153. Larson v. Larson, 122 So. 3d 1213, 1216 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013). 
154. Id. Justifying the decision to characterize the property as separate, the court concluded: 
“[The wife] did not actively participate in the business, did not participate in business decisions, and 
did not invest or contribute money to its ongoing operations.” Id. 
155. 24 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), appeal allowed, 31 N.E.3d 767 (Ill. 2015). 
156. Id. at 170. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 169. 
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from Blumenthal’s greater net worth at the end of the relationship.”160 
Speaking to the question of net worth, the court remarked “due to the 
disproportionate time and attention that Blumenthal was able to give to 
her career during the relationship, Blumenthal has not only a valuable 
medical practice, but also more income and savings than Brewer.”161 
The court acknowledged, then, that Blumenthal’s superior financial 
position at the dissolution of the relationship was created through not 
only Blumenthal’s labor but also Brewer’s contributions. While property 
distribution was not the claim before the court,
162
 a look at the couple’s 
assets makes clear that Blumenthal’s medical practice—and any increase 
in its value during the time of the couple’s relationship—would form a 
key part of the marital estate. Speculating as to what property division 
under equitable distribution would look like, Brewer would be entitled to 
a percentage of the increase in value to Blumenthal’s practice and 
Blumenthal’s professional goodwill could also be valued and equitably 
distributed. Extrapolating from precedent, however, Brewer would 
receive only a small percentage of the increase in value to Blumenthal’s 
practice and her indirect contributions to the practice would not likely be 
properly compensated. The relationship between Brewer and Blumenthal 
gives us a preview, then, of how specialized labor will remain 
problematic for all couples until indirect contributions—mainly 
housework and carework—are counted as full participation in 
marriage.
163
 Moreover, their relationship and its dissolution reveal how 
persistent the problem of gender will be in the absence of reform. 
2.  Distribution and Support as Compensatory Mechanisms 
Courts prefer to use distribution and support, rather than 
reconstruction and expansion of the marital estate, as compensatory 
                                                     
160. Id. at 172. 
161. Id.  
162. The legal question before the court was whether Brewer could continue with her claim, 
given the strong precedent of Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1979) (ruling against division 
of cohabitant assets on public policy grounds). 
163. For a similar case, see Londergan v. Carrillo, No. 08-P-1699, 2009 WL 2163186 (Mass. 
App. Ct. July 22, 2009). Londergan was the primary caretaker of the couple’s children and had been 
the stay-at-home mother, while Carrillo “assumed the role as breadwinner and worked demanding 
hours as a surgeon.” Id. at *1. This agreement to specialize labor resulted in significant income 
disparity. The trial court judge “determined that Carrillo’s gross income as an orthopedic 
surgeon . . . was an estimated $201,856 . . . . Londergan, although trained as a lawyer, had a gross 
income of $37,960.” Id. Londergan received a two-year award of rehabilitative alimony. Id. 
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mechanisms.
164
 All equitable distribution states set forth a list of factors 
for courts to consider in distributing marital property, and permit courts 
great discretion in deciding how to weigh the various factors. Most states 
factor in the contributions made by each party to the marital wealth of 
the couple.
165
 North Carolina, for example, specifies that courts shall 
consider “[a]ny equitable claim to, interest in, or direct or indirect 
contribution made to the acquisition of such marital property by the 
party not having title, including joint efforts or expenditures and 
contributions and services, or lack thereof, as a spouse, parent, wage 
earner or homemaker” as well as “[a]ny direct or indirect contribution 
made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career potential of 
the other spouse.”166 Moreover, equitable distribution statutes uniformly 
allow courts the discretion to consider “[a]ny other factor which the 
court finds to be just and proper.”167 
Using distribution, however, has its drawbacks. One drawback is that, 
in the context of professional degrees, if one spouse has enjoyed 
enhanced income flowing from the other’s degree for a number of years, 
the court takes this into consideration and generally disallows or 
discounts any discretionary compensation.
168
 Another problem is that, in 
some states, equitable distribution statutes mandate equal division. Equal 
division precludes courts from using discretion to compensate economic 
dependents. Even when states do not mandate equal distribution, courts 
                                                     
164. The Colorado Supreme Court observed in In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676 (Colo. 
1987), that, in order to avoid unfairness, “[t]he contribution of one spouse to the education of the 
other spouse may be taken into consideration when marital property is divided.” Id. at 680; see also 
Roberts v. Roberts, 670 N.E.2d 72, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (“Therefore, while Indiana does not 
permit a degree to be included as marital property, and further will not allow an award of future 
earnings unless the spouse qualifies for maintenance, nevertheless the earning ability of the degree-
earning spouse may be considered in determining the distribution of the marital estate.”). 
165. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-20 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.); TEX. FAM. 
CODE ANN. § 8.051 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). Martha Fineman notes that the 
factors that courts use can be broken down into four categories: title, fault, need, and contribution. 
See FINEMAN, supra note 48, at 41. 
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-20. 
167. Id. § 50-20(c)(12). 
168. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 179–81, 677 P.2d 152, 159 (1984). The 
Washburn Court explained:  
We point out that where a marriage endures for some time after the professional degree is 
obtained, the supporting spouse may already have benefited financially from the student 
spouse’s increased earning capacity to an extent that would make extra compensation 
inappropriate. For example, he or she may have enjoyed a high standard of living for several 
years. Or perhaps the professional degree made possible the accumulation of substantial 
community assets which may be equitably divided. 
Id. at 181, 677 P.2d at 159; see also Nelson v. Nelson, 736 P.2d 1145, 1147 (Alaska 1987). 
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are unlikely to deviate from equal division because many distribution 
statutes require the court to put in writing its reasons for deviation. 
Courts are, in addition, concerned that these decisions are more likely to 
be overruled on appeal. A wife’s contributions are therefore likely to be 
undercompensated in the push for equal division. Accordingly, the 
“[f]ormal equal division of marital property does little to resolve the 
deeper substantive inequality between men and women.”169 
Most courts, however, use maintenance awards rather than 
distribution to compensate contributing spouses because the majority of 
couples do not have sufficient liquid assets to make distribution matter. 
As the Colorado Supreme Court noted: “[Distribution] is effective only 
if sufficient marital property has been accumulated by the parties during 
their marriage.”170 The Alaska Supreme Court, in Nelson v. Nelson,171 
described the classic professional degree dilemma: “Typically, one 
spouse attains a degree while the other provides support; then a divorce 
occurs soon after graduation. Usually there are few assets immediately 
available, but one spouse leaves the marriage with an education and 
increased earning potential, while the other spouse is given nothing for 
her efforts.”172 Because of these liquidity problems, courts commonly 
conclude that maintenance is the most suitable method for 
compensation.
173
 As with distribution, alimony statutes allow courts to 
consider a number of factors in awarding maintenance, including “[t]he 
contribution by one spouse to the education, training, or increased 
earning power of the other spouse,”174 and “[t]he contribution of a 
spouse as homemaker.”175 
There are, nevertheless, problems with the maintenance approach. To 
begin, the low- or non-earner must often pass a needs test in order to 
qualify for alimony. In Texas, for example, the party seeking 
maintenance must show either that she “is unable to earn sufficient 
income to provide for [her] minimum reasonable needs because of an 
                                                     
169. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 121. 
170. In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1987). 
171. 736 P.2d 1145 (Alaska 1987). 
172. Id. at 1146. 
173. Olar, 747 P.2d at 680 (“The situation in which the dissolution of marriage occurs before 
the benefits of the advanced degree can be realized, and where no marital property is accumulated, 
requires us to look to another remedy for the inequity that results for the working spouse. Another 
option . . . [is] an award of maintenance as a need is demonstrated.”); Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d at 
180–81, 677 P.2d at 159 (awarding maintenance and providing equitable factors for adjusting 
award). 
174. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-16.3A(b)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
175. Id. § 50-16-3A(b)(12). 
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incapacitating physical or mental disability”176 or that she “has been 
married to the other spouse for 10 years or longer and lacks the ability to 
earn sufficient income to provide for [her] minimum reasonable 
needs.”177 Not surprisingly, courts have construed “reasonable needs” 
very differently, with some courts adopting an extremely narrow reading 
of the term such that it means “the minimum requirements to sustain 
life.”178 Making even a small salary, therefore, could preclude a spouse 
from being eligible for maintenance and, consequently, any 
compensatory amount encompassed in the support award. 
Even if a spouse is eligible to receive maintenance, courts are not in 
agreement regarding the type of alimony that is appropriate. Many 
courts do not use permanent or rehabilitative alimony for the purpose of 
compensating spousal contributions.
179
 Moreover, courts in some states 
have refused to award reimbursement alimony, the third kind of alimony 
that exists, on the grounds that: “Marriage is not a business arrangement 
in which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts to be 
settled upon divorce. Rather, as we have said, ‘marriage is a shared 
enterprise, a joint undertaking . . . in many ways it is akin to a 
partnership.’”180 Those courts that do award reimbursement alimony 
generally limit the amount of reimbursement to the cost of the 
education.
181
 In Hoak v. Hoak,
182
 for example, the Court endorsed this 
                                                     
176. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 8.051(2)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
177. Id. § 8.051(2)(b). The third provision allows for maintenance if the spouse seeking 
maintenance is “the custodian of a child of the marriage of any age who requires substantial care 
and personal supervision because of a physical or mental disability that prevents the spouse from 
earning sufficient income to provide for the spouse’s minimum reasonable needs.” Id. § 8.051(2)(c); 
see also Olar, 747 P.2d at 681 (“[A] trial court may use an award of maintenance as a tool to 
balance equities and compensate a spouse whose work has enabled the other spouse to obtain an 
education; however, this tool is available for use only where the spouse seeking maintenance meets 
the statutory threshold requirements of need.” (emphasis added) (quoting In re Marriage of McVey, 
641 P.2d 300, 301 (Colo. App. 1981))). 
178. Olar, 747 P.2d at 681 (“This ‘threshold of need’ was not defined in McVey, but appears 
to have incorporated the concept of the minimum requirements to sustain life.”). 
179. See In re Marriage of Francis, 442 N.W.2d 59, 63 (Iowa 1989) (“The alimony of which 
we speak is designed to give the ‘supporting’ spouse a stake in the ‘student’ spouse’s future earning 
capacity, in exchange for recognizable contributions to the source of that income—the student’s 
advanced education. As such, it is to be clearly distinguished from ‘rehabilitative’ or ‘permanent’ 
alimony.”). 
180. Washburn v. Washburn, 101 Wash. 2d 168, 181, 677 P.2d 152, 159–60 (1984) (quoting 
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982)). 
181. See, e.g., DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa, 309 N.W.2d 755, 758–59 (Minn. 1981); Hubbard v. 
Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750–53 (Okla. 1979); Beeler v. Beeler, 715 S.W.2d 625, 627 (Tenn. Ct. 
App. 1986); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473, 475–79 (W. Va. 1988). 
182. 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988). 
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approach because it avoided complicated questions of valuation: “Unlike 
an award based on the value of a professional degree, reimbursement 
alimony is based on the actual amount of contributions, and does not 
require a judge to guess about future earnings, inflation, the relative 
values of the spouses’ contributions, etc.”183 This conception of 
enhanced earning capacity, narrowing compensation to reimbursement, 
fails to capture the workings of the larger marital bargain. 
Finally, distribution and maintenance are not only flawed mechanisms 
for compensating spousal contributions but also theoretically 
inapposite.
184
 Using distribution or maintenance to solve the 
compensation problem puts the non- or low-earner’s award in the realm 
of discretionary decision-making and judicial generosity: “[Alimony] 
places men’s claims to family wealth in the nondiscretionary realm of 
entitlement, while women’s and children’s claims are relegated to the 
discretionary realm of family law, where the issue is one of whether 
courts will redistribute ‘the man’s income.’”185 A distribution or spousal 
support award profoundly fails to reflect the idea of marriage as an 
economic partnership in which two individuals share equally in the 
financial successes and losses of the unit. Distribution and maintenance, 
in this way, fail to capture the normative good of the property 
framework, which is to “encourage people to invest, to labor, and to plan 
carefully” such that “people will work and trade and make everyone 
collectively better off.”186 
B.  Why and How to Reward Spousal Contributions 
The question—understanding that the same problems that have 
plagued different-sex couples will continue to burden same-sex 
                                                     
183. Id. at 477–78 (awarding the wife $100,000 as reimbursement alimony, calculating “all 
financial contributions towards the former spouse’s education, including household expenses, 
educational costs, school travel expenses, and any other contributions used by the supported spouse 
in obtaining his or her degree or license” (emphasis in original) (quoting Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 
535)). 
184. Practically speaking, property division also has a number of benefits for the receiver: 
There is no tax on a lump sum received as part of property division (while alimony is taxable), there 
is no risk of non-payment, and there is no issue of discounted present value. See Mnookin & 
Kornhauser, supra note 84, at 962. 
185. Williams, supra note 6, at 2234. But see Regan, supra note 47, at 2350 (“The suggestion 
by some feminists that a property-based model of autonomy and obligation marginalizes many 
women’s experiences should at least give us pause in relying on property rhetoric to argue that 
women should have greater claims on their husbands’ post-divorce income.”). 
186. See Carol M. Rose, Rhetoric and Romance: A Comment on Spouses and Strangers, 82 
GEO. L.J. 2409, 2417 (1994). 
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couples—is how courts should reflect the notion of economic 
partnership and compensate spouses for specialization of labor in marital 
property division. The idea of reimbursement, as we have seen in the 
alimony context, falls far short of appropriate compensation. Another 
approach is to compensate the low-earner for household labor by placing 
a market value on this labor at the time of divorce. This approach is also 
problematic because of the systemic devaluation of care and domestic 
work. Herma Hill Kay argues for approaching “the degree dilemma 
through the analysis of the loss incurred by the supporting spouse rather 
than attempting to divide the gain realized by the supported student 
spouse.”187 Rhode and Minow likewise contend that “spouses should be 
entitled to a proportion of each other’s past and future earning potential 
commensurate with their contribution to the relationship and with the 
personal loss in earning potential that it has entailed.”188 The idea of lost 
opportunity or wages is problematic because it presents the same 
problems of valuation that plague professional degrees and is 
sufficiently speculative to make it an unappealing method of assessment 
for courts. Lost opportunity may be, however, the most promising 
theoretical grounds for awarding contributing spouses a share of the 
earning spouse’s income post-divorce. 
What is critically important, regardless of the approach,
189
 is that 
courts reduce the focus on individual entitlements and base marital 
property division on shared accomplishment.
190
 Sharing, Dagan and 
Frantz posit, is the “linchpin of [marital] community” and essential to its 
success is the rejection of individual interest: “Sharing requires spouses 
to ‘infuse[] costs and benefits with an intersubjective character’ and to 
                                                     
187. Kay, supra note 9, at 31; see also Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1 (1989); Allen M. Parkman, Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce 
Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439 (1987). 
188. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 201. Joan Krauskopf also endorses the contribution 
theory. See Joan M. Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse’s Education: Legal Protection 
for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980). A significant problem with 
the contribution approach is that “there is a risk that the traditional devaluation of domestic labor 
will lead to low estimates of the value of those contributions to the acquisition of enhanced earning 
power.” Regan, supra note 47, at 2355. 
189. The three main strategies discussed for compensating female labor at home are strikingly 
similar to those evaluated at the turn of the nineteenth century in the context of allowances for 
wives. Viviane Zelizer notes that the strategies were “payment (direct exchange); an entitlement 
(the right to share); and gift (one person’s voluntary bestowal on another).” VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, 
THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 42 (1995). 
190. Rhode & Minow, supra note 47, at 203. 
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reject any ‘strict accounting based on individual merit.’”191 In other 
words, to make equal partnership work, spouses must act daily “with 
reference to a collective welfare that powerfully informs the calculation 
of individual utility.”192 Key to this shift in perspective is the 
understanding that the “[t]he ideal-worker’s salary . . . reflects the work 
of two adults: the ideal-worker’s market labor and the marginalized-
caregiver’s unpaid labor.”193 The family income does not only represent 
the separate work of two individuals but also the shared work of two 
people who have bargained for joint success. Therefore, while “the 
husband owns his wage vis a vis his employer, . . . this does not 
determine whether he owns it vis a vis his family.”194 
This approach to marital earnings operates on the premise that the 
socio-legal meaning of the high-earner’s wage transforms from market 
wage to domestic dollar. That is, the wage the husband earns is a market 
dollar with respect to the workplace and its purchasing power. However, 
in the marital context—in home budgeting, on tax returns, and at 
divorce—that dollar is a domestic one, to be shared by spouses. Once the 
wage is earmarked as domestic dollar, not only does its meaning change, 
so does its ownership.
195
 A contributing spouse has, from this 
perspective, an entitlement to the earning spouse’s income as during the 
intact marriage. Post-divorce, the contributing spouse has a property 
claim to some amount of future income based on both contributions that 
were never properly compensated as well as lost opportunity. 
Alternately, the contributing spouse has a property claim if we believe 
that marriage rules should support a “vision of marriage as an egalitarian 
liberal community . . . [that] accommodates community, autonomy, and 
                                                     
191. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 82–83. This theory can cut both ways; historically 
individual accounting was disallowed, and this barred married women from recovering their assets. 
See supra notes 69–70 (discussing concept of sharing within relationships).  
192. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 147 (1995). But 
see Rose, supra note 186, at 2413–15 (pointing out that marital bargains may also be inequitable 
and spouses may in fact engage in counting debits and credits even within an intact marriage). 
While undoubtedly true, the model of equal partnership is normatively preferable and should be 
assumed for purposes of equitable distribution, absent antenuptial agreements to the contrary. 
193. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229. This may be akin to Cynthia Starnes’ analogy of the 
marriage as a partnership and divorce as a buyout. See Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced 
Homemaker: A Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-
Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993).  
194. Williams, supra note 6, at 2229. 
195. For a discussion of the domestic dollar and the concept of social earmarking, see 
ZELIZER, supra note 189, at 35–70 (1995). 
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equality.”196 In this section, I discuss the ways in which New York 
courts have valued spousal contributions, thereby actualizing the notion 
of economic partnership. 
1.  A Proposal to Value Enhanced Earnings 
Highlighting the importance of treating enhanced earning capacity as 
property, Dagan and Frantz state: “A commitment to the ideal of 
marriage as an egalitarian liberal community requires treating spouses’ 
increased earning capacity as marital property.”197 They further 
underscore the importance of this career asset by observing: “The joint 
creation of careers is often one of the most important projects of 
marriage. Therefore, excluding earning capacity from the marital estate 
‘makes a mockery of the equal division rule.’”198 A strong model for 
judicial decision-making premised on an egalitarian idea of the domestic 
dollar comes from New York. This recognition of the shared ownership 
of a domestic dollar is evident in New York’s treatment of professional 
degrees. New York is the only state to recognize professional degrees as 
marital property, and the case that established the rule in 1985, O’Brien 
v. O’Brien,199 is instructive. The O’Brien Court began by stating that 
professional degrees were capable of being characterized as marital 
property because “our statute recognizes that spouses have an equitable 
claim to things of value arising out of the marital relationship and 
classifies them as subject to distribution by focusing on the marital status 
of the parties at the time of acquisition.”200 Marital property, the Court 
stated, was a statutory creation “of no meaning whatsoever during the 
normal course of a marriage and arises full-grown, like Athena, upon the 
signing of a separation agreement or the commencement of a 
matrimonial action.”201 That “traditional common law property 
concepts” did not align with all forms of marital property, the Court 
remarked, was neither surprising nor troubling.
202
 
The Court further observed that the legislative history of the statute 
confirmed the appropriateness of treating a professional degree as 
                                                     
196. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 133; see also HANOCH DAGAN, RECONSTRUCTING 
AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM & RETHINKING PRIVATE PROPERTY LAW 161–92 (2013). 
197. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 107–08. 
198. Id. at 108. 
199. 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985).  
200. Id. at 715 (emphasis added). 
201. Id. 
202. Id.  
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marital property. “Equitable distribution was based on the premise that a 
marriage is, among other things, an economic partnership to which both 
parties contribute as spouse, parent, wage earner or homemaker.”203 The 
Court recounted how Mrs. O’Brien had devoted almost all of the time 
during their nine-year marriage to putting her husband through medical 
school, working the entire time and “contribut[ing] all of her earnings to 
their joint effort.”204 At the close of his education, her husband left her 
and, had the degree not been counted as marital property, she would 
have been left with nothing. The Court therefore allowed the degree to 
count as property and remanded the case for a determination of its 
value.
205
 
O’Brien provided precedential authority for extending the logic of the 
medical degree as marital property to a law degree,
206
 an accounting 
degree,
207
 a podiatry practice,
208
 the licensing and certification of a 
physician’s assistant,209 a Master’s degree in teaching,210 and a 
fellowship in the Society of Actuaries.
211
 Based on the idea that the 
marital estate consists of “things of value” acquired during marriage, a 
New York court also extended the ruling to encompass celebrity 
status.
212
 In Elkus v. Elkus,
213
 the husband of opera singer Frederica Von 
Stade claimed that the celebrity status she gained during their marriage 
as an opera singer was due, in large part, to his contributions to her 
career. He claimed that this celebrity status was marital property, and the 
court agreed.
214
 
In all of these cases, the New York courts put front and center the 
                                                     
203. Id. at 716 (citation omitted). 
204. Id. 
205. Mrs. O’Brien was subsequently awarded $188,800. O’Brien v. O’Brien, 502 N.Y.S.2d 
250, 251 (1986). 
206. Cronin v. Cronin, 502 N.Y.S.2d 368 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
207. Vanasco v. Vanasco, 503 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup. Ct. 1986). 
208. Morton v. Morton, 515 N.Y.S.2d 499 (App. Div. 1987). 
209. Morimando v. Morimando, 536 N.Y.S.2d 701 (App. Div. 1988). 
210. McGowan v. McGowan, 535 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div. 1988). 
211. McAlpine v. McAlpine, 539 N.Y.S.2d 680 (Sup. Ct. 1989). 
212. Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (App. Div. 1991) (“Things of value acquired 
during marriage are marital property even though they may fall outside the scope of traditional 
property concepts.” (citations omitted)). 
213. 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (App. Div. 1991). 
214. Id. at 903 (“Any attempt to limit marital property to professions which are licensed 
would only serve to discriminate against the spouses of those engaged in other areas of 
employment. Such a distinction would fail to carry out the premise upon which equitable 
distribution is based, i.e., that a marriage is an economic partnership . . . .”). 
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idea of economic partnership.
215
 O’Brien introduced the concept of 
enhanced earning capacity to describe the income differential that not 
only degree attainment but also spousal contributions produce. It is this 
combination of professional success and spousal sacrifice that courts 
must capture in order to better reflect marital bargains that rely on 
specialized labor and unpaid spousal contributions. Consequently, 
contributing spouses should have a property right to a portion of the 
earning spouse’s income not just during marriage but also for a certain 
number of years post-divorce in order to equalize their financial 
situations and “ameliorate the serious problems gender inequality causes 
in the marital relationship.”216 The number of years or the dollar amount 
that the contributing spouse receives could be measured by the amount 
of time and the degree to which the spouses specialized their labor. 
Valuation methods such as the “if and when” method could also help 
alleviate autonomy concerns with respect to the earning spouse by 
allowing for modification of the award due to career change or other 
changes in financial circumstances. 
Ultimately, the professional degree question is no more than a signal 
of the larger question of spousal contributions. As New York courts have 
recognized, characterizing professional degrees and celebrity status as 
marital property is an imperfect but useful way to capture the value of 
these contributions. In order to avoid “property hoarding,”217 as Martha 
Ertman calls it, courts must recognize enhanced earning capacity as it 
exists in multiple forms and patterns in order to capture and compensate 
spousal contributions. This will help both different- and same-sex 
couples by clarifying the rules around spousal contributions and 
recognizing that both education and earning capacity are critical family 
assets, rather than individual ones, when couples arrange to specialize 
labor. 
2.  A Case Study: Home Management and Dragon Slaying 
New York courts have been leaders in conceptualizing degrees and 
status as marital property. They have also established strong precedent 
                                                     
215. Even in New York, however, percentages that courts award are decreasing, and ten 
percent is the current standard. See Esposito-Shea v. Shea, 941 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (App. Div. 2012) 
(“Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that Supreme Court abused its discretion in limiting the 
husband’s distributive share of the wife’s law degree to 10% of its overall value.” (citations 
omitted)); Carman v. Carman, 802 N.Y.S.2d 558 (App. Div. 2005); Farrell v. Cleary–Farrell, 761 
N.Y.S.2d 357 (App. Div. 2003); Brough v. Brough, 727 N.Y.S.2d 555 (App. Div. 2001). 
216. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 75, at 122.  
217. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 130. 
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for compensating contributing spouses in the context of family business 
or corporate assets. While trial courts have decreased awards over the 
past few decades, lowering the percentage of the increase in value going 
to the contributing spouse, a New York trial court recently reconfirmed 
the principles of economic partnership in a case from 2014, Sykes v. 
Sykes.
218
 In that case, one of the major questions confronting the court 
was what percentage of value in the husband’s business to award the 
wife.
219
 The husband had started a hedge fund while they were married, 
and the two parties stipulated the value of the hedge fund at eight million 
dollars at the time of divorce.
220
 The wife claimed that she was entitled 
to half the value, while the husband claimed she was entitled to no more 
than five percent.
221
 
The dispositive question, then, was what contributions the wife had 
made to the husband’s career success. The court first observed: 
“Considering defendant’s lack of training or experience in business or 
finances in general, let alone in hedge funds or the world of mortgage-
backed securities, she cannot be expected to have been directly involved 
in the workings of [the hedge fund].”222 Nevertheless, the court stated 
that, following cases like Price, nonremunerated services and indirect 
contributions were to be considered of value in the equation.
223
 
Consequently, substantial trial time went toward establishing (or 
contesting) the extent of the wife’s contributions. The husband “took the 
position that even though defendant did not work outside the home and 
was very much a ‘stay-at-home mom,’ her contributions on the domestic 
front were ultimately quite limited.”224 He argued that his wife did not 
perform housework, did not cook or clean, and did not even perform the 
task of “removing the plastic from the dry cleaning.”225 The wife, he 
argued, “outsourced most domestic chores”226 and was reliant on staff to 
                                                     
218. Sykes v. Sykes, No. 313085, 2014 WL 1797010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 2, 2014). 
219. Id. at *1. 
220. Id. at *4. 
221. Id. The court noted from the outset that the presumption in such cases was not one of 
equal division. Id. at *4–5 (“Although the law often favors a distribution of marital assets that is as 
equal as possible, especially in a marriage of a fairly long duration such as this, it cannot be said that 
a fifty-fifty division of a titled spouse’s business is the standard irrespective of the contribution by 
the non-titled spouse. Contrary to what defendant argues, case law has long confirmed that business 
assets are to be treated differently from other assets for purposes of equitable distribution.”). 
222. Id. at *5. 
223. Id.  
224. Id. at *7. 
225. Id. at *6. 
226. Id. 
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perform most household chores as well as childcare.
227
 The husband also 
presented evidence that the wife entertained infrequently, and failed 
therefore to take on the role of “corporate spouse.”228 
The wife, at trial, did not contest her husband’s assertions that she 
outsourced a great deal of household labor. Nor did she try to establish 
that she had been an asset to his business development through her social 
efforts and activities. Instead, she testified about the nature and the 
specifics of the bargain that the two had agreed upon: 
My husband always said that he wanted us—he wanted to be the 
one that would be in charge of the money and working, slaying 
the dragons on Wall Street; and I would be the one in charge of 
the home, the family, our son, anything else. He also said he 
liked to keep his home life separate from his work life because 
he really wanted space where he relaxed and just would calm 
down, because there were so many stresses with his job. And 
that was my job, to make sure when he came home he could be 
rejuvenated and go back out and slay the dragons on Wall 
Street.
229
 
The agreement, according to the wife, provided for a high degree of 
specialized household labor and left her in charge of the domestic 
sphere. 
Evaluating the competing evidence concerning the wife’s 
contributions to her husband’s financial success, the court accorded great 
weight to the wife’s testimony about the couple’s marital bargain. 
Referencing their explicit oral agreement to “divide and conquer,” the 
court stated it was “disingenuous” for the husband to “denigrate” the 
value of his wife’s role when it was exactly what they had bargained for. 
With respect to being a corporate wife, the court remarked that the 
husband seldom socialized with colleagues or asked his wife to throw 
parties or invite colleagues over for dinner. Addressing the larger 
question of the wife’s contributions, the court concluded that she had 
contributed to her husband’s success in context-appropriate ways. The 
court observed that social norms prescribed that the wife employ a full 
staff, delegate a range of menial chores, and hire full-time help for 
childcare purposes.
230
 Referencing household management 
responsibilities taken on by women running great estates, the court 
remarked: 
                                                     
227. Id. at *6–7. 
228. Id. at *5. 
229. Id. at *7 (citation omitted). 
230. Id. at *6. 
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Like a latter-day Cora Crawley, Countess of Grantham, who 
unquestionably runs the household at Downton Abbey despite 
the presence of Mr. Carson, Mrs. Hughes, Mrs. Patmore and 
Daisy, defendant unquestionably ran the Sykes household in 
New York, East Hampton and Paris despite the presence of 
cooks, personal assistants and the person who unsheathed the 
dry cleaning.
231
 
A wife who engaged in neither paid labor nor housework was, the court 
stated, a signal of status for the husband.
232
 
Ultimately, the court awarded the wife thirty percent of the value of 
her husband’s hedge fund.233 While the judicial result did not yield an 
equal division of the husband’s interest in the business, it did 
intentionally reflect the ideals of economic partnership and value the 
contributions of both partners according to the bargain they had struck. 
Moreover, rather than discounting unpaid spousal contribution to the 
business as “modest”234 or passive, the court fully understood that the 
wife’s active role as both home manager and status symbol added 
significant value to the marriage. This reasoning captures what is 
critically important—an understanding of both economic partnership and 
the shared ownership of the domestic dollar. Applying this judicial logic 
to the Blumenthal v. Brewer case, for example, would result in an award 
of similar proportions of the value of Blumenthal’s medical practice 
going to Brewer to compensate her for caretaking and lost opportunity. 
Accordingly, this reasoning can, looking forward, provide guidance for 
courts in both different- and same-sex divorces because it addresses both 
why and how to value spousal contributions, particularly within 
conventional marital bargains. 
III.  ENLARGING THE MARITAL GRID 
If which assets to count as marital property is the first challenge that 
courts confront in making property distribution more equitable, when to 
start counting is the second. The general rule in equitable distribution is 
that courts characterize as marital property only those assets that the 
                                                     
231. Id. at *7. 
232. Id. One of the highest forms of conspicuous consumption for a household is to have a 
highly educated wife and mother who does not work outside the home. See THORSTEIN VEBLEN, 
THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (2007). For a more light-hearted take, see WEDNESDAY 
MARTIN, PRIMATES OF PARK AVENUE: A MEMOIR (2015). 
233. Sykes, 2014 WL 1797010, at *8. 
234. See Arvantides v. Arvantides, 478 N.E.2d 199, 199–200 (N.Y. 1985). 
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couple acquired during the span of the marriage.
235
 Therefore, even if a 
couple has lived together for ten or twenty years before deciding to 
marry, the assets acquired before the marriage do not form part of the 
marital estate. The problem is that economic partnership is rarely 
perfectly coextensive with marriage. A New York court framed the 
problem this way: 
Does the “confidential relationship” suddenly blossom at the 
time of the posing of the age-old question: “Will you marry 
me?” When does the romantic relationship become transformed 
into a confidential or fiduciary relationship? . . . Attempting to 
pinpoint the exact time when the “fiduciary relationship” 
emerged will plunge the court into the hearts of both parties and 
ask this court to determine the exact degree of emotional 
attachment between two persons.
236
 
Trying to pinpoint the precise moment that an economic partnership 
begins is a difficult proposition. However, in order to fully incorporate 
the concept of marriage as an economic partnership in rules governing 
divorce, courts will have to enlarge the marital grid and look beyond 
traditional rules around timing. In addition, with the first wave of same-
sex divorces appearing on their dockets, property questions raised by 
“hybrid” relationships—in which couples have cohabited for significant 
amounts of time and built a shared life together before marrying once 
they were legally able—will be particularly pressing. 
In this Part, I discuss ways that courts have, in the past, avoided 
privileging the moment of marriage as the only indicator of a serious 
economic partnership between intimates. First, I discuss the concept of 
“pre-marital” property and how it can provide a blueprint for courts 
addressing claims relating to particular assets, such as the family home. 
Subsequently, I analyze the question of when to begin measuring or 
counting more generally, in cases that are not asset specific. For 
example, I examine how a court should define the durational measure of 
a relationship for the purposes of defining the marital estate or awarding 
maintenance. I propose that courts rely on legal markers and signals of 
legal intent, for reasons of both autonomy and efficiency, to determine 
when a partnership begins. 
                                                     
235. Any other assets belonging to individuals are considered to be separate property and not 
subject to division. The categories of marital and separate property are statutorily defined, as are 
typical exceptions such as gifts or bequests received during marriage. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3501 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
236. McKeown v. Frederick, No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697, at *6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 
2013). 
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A.  Transforming Non-Marital into Pre-Marital Property 
Couples cohabit before marrying for various reasons—they want a 
“test period” before marriage, they are planning to marry but are saving 
money first, they want to take advantage of the economic benefit of two 
people living together but are not ready to marry. At this particular 
historical moment, same-sex couples have cohabited rather than married 
in many cases not because of personal preference but rather on account 
of legal prohibition. In the case of different-sex cohabitants, the couples 
may decide sooner or later to marry; in the case of same-sex cohabitants, 
waves of couples are marrying as they obtain the legal right to do so. If 
and when any one of these long-term cohabiting couples divorce, courts 
will be faced with the property claims produced by “hybrid” 
relationships in which the couple has both cohabited, living as if 
married, and then subsequently married. 
These “hybrid” divorces will be the most difficult for courts to 
assess—and risk the most unfair results—when couples, for one reason 
or another, have placed most assets and property in the name of one 
partner or when the parties have specialized labor before marriage. In 
these cases, to not count property acquired during the cohabitation 
period at the moment of distribution has the potential to create great 
economic harm and hardship for the low earner or non-title-holder. The 
courts are not, however, without guidance. Relevant examples exist with 
cases involving different-sex hybrid marriages, which demonstrate how 
courts can produce equitable results. In this section, I discuss legal 
strategies that courts have used in order to evaluate hybrid relationships 
and grant rights to cohabiting partners who subsequently marry. 
Furthermore, I analyze why it is preferable for courts to enlarge marital 
estates and create property subject to equitable distribution rather than 
deploy equitable remedies, which is the traditional judicial approach to 
cohabitant property claims. 
1.  Recognizing Relationships on the Marital Fringe 
Because most legal rights and responsibilities in a romantic 
relationship begin at the moment of marriage, courts often do not assess 
premarital moments of commitment and partnership. Nevertheless, 
myriad markers of commitment to a romantic and economic partnership 
have always existed—the moment of engagement being the most 
historically salient. Historically, women obtained a circumscribed set of 
rights at the moment of engagement, and could bring legal claims 
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against their fiancés for things such as breach of promise.
237
 Even in the 
modern context, courts have used engagement as a privileged moment in 
claims concerning the measuring of a marital estate. These cases provide 
precedent for courts to rule that equitable division of property should 
encompass certain “pre-marital” property pursuant to the economic 
partnership theory.
238
 
A set of New Jersey cases is particularly instructive. In 1985, Coney 
v. Coney
239
 turned on the question of whether a wife, who held sole title 
to the marital residence that was purchased when the couple was 
unmarried, could exempt the property from equitable distribution.
240
 At 
the time of divorce, the couple had lived together for seventeen years 
and been married for only seven of those years. The wife argued that the 
house was separate property and that her husband’s reimbursement 
should be limited to mortgage pay-down. The court disagreed. 
In analyzing the claim, the court suggested that three categories of 
property existed: non-marital property, cohabitation property, and pre-
marital property.
241
 Non-marital property was property that “the party 
seeking equitable distribution had nothing to do with prior to the 
marriage, either by way of funds or services.”242 The court defined 
cohabitation property as “that which arises out of cohabitation of the 
parties, not followed by a marriage,”243 and proposed that equitable 
                                                     
237. See MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 34 (1985); Melissa Murray, Marriage as Punishment, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
238. In situations where the trajectory of cohabitation leading to marriage is reversed (i.e., 
cohabitation occurs after divorce), courts have also been amenable to providing remedy for 
economic dependents. See Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So. 2d 872, 875 (Miss. 1986) (allowing for 
equitable distribution of post-marital property, stating “our law authorizes and sanctions an 
equitable division of property accumulated by two persons as a result of their joint efforts. This 
would be the case were a common law business partnership breaking up”). The Court added that the 
assets subject to distribution were “by no means limited to a consideration of the earnings of the 
parties and cash contributions made by each to the accumulation of the properties.” Id. at 876. The 
Court continued: “As any freshman economics student knows, services and in kind contributions 
have an economic value . . . . Where, as here, the man accepted the benefit of such services, he will 
not be heard to argue that he did not need them and that their economic value should not be 
considered as the woman’s economic contributions to the joint accumulation of property between 
them.” Id.  
239. 503 A.2d 912 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1985). 
240. Id. at 914. (“By the time of settlement, defendant had already obtained a divorce from 
her former spouse, but plaintiff’s action was still pending. Therefore, title was taken in defendant’s 
name alone, and she executed a mortgage for $16,000 to complete the settlement.”). 
241. Id. at 916–18. 
242. Id. at 916. 
243. Id.  
08 - Tait.docx (Do Not Delete) 10/23/2015  12:48 PM 
2015] DIVORCE EQUALITY 1297 
 
remedies were appropriate in these cases. The third category, pre-marital 
property, “occurs where one or both marital parties acquired either 
personal or real property jointly and made contribution to the same 
before marriage.”244 The court pointed out that “[t]his theory rests on the 
proposition that property so acquired was in ‘contemplation of marriage’ 
and therefore subject to equitable distribution.”245 Accordingly, the court 
concluded that, because the “parties acquired the property specifically 
for family purposes” and both made “substantial contributions thereto,” 
the value of the property was to be equally divided.
246
 
Three years later, Weiss v. Weiss
247
 turned on the same question of 
whether a home, purchased by an engaged couple before marriage, was 
exempt from equitable distribution because only one party held title to 
the house.
248
 The court concluded, referencing Coney: “[W]e believe that 
for the purpose of triggering a right of equitable distribution a marital 
partnership may be found to have commenced prior to the marriage 
ceremony . . . . This conclusion recognizes that the ‘shared enterprise’ of 
marriage may begin even before the actual marriage ceremony.”249 
Placing two conditions on this ruling, the court stated that the parties 
must have adequately expressed the intention for the asset to be a shared 
one and that they must have acquired the asset in specific contemplation 
of their marriage.
250
 Similarly, in McGee v. McGee,
251
 a New Jersey trial 
court included a family home owned by one party and purchased prior to 
marriage in the marital estate.
252
 In so doing, the court explained that 
“[t]he case can be viewed from the vantage point of the shared enterprise 
of marriage beginning before the ceremonial act.”253 
Finally, in Berrie v. Berrie,
254
 a New Jersey court expanded the rule 
concerning pre-marital property to encompass assets other than the 
marital home.
255
 In that case, the plaintiff’s wife sought equitable 
                                                     
244. Id. at 917. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. at 919. 
247. 543 A.2d 1062 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988). 
248. Id. at 1063. 
249. Id. at 1065; see also In re Marriage of Altman, 530 P.2d 1012 (Colo. App. 1974); 
Stallings v. Stallings, 393 N.E.2d 1065 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Bender v. Bender, 386 A.2d 772, 778–
79 (Md. 1978). 
250. Weiss, 543 A.2d at 1065. 
251. 648 A.2d 1128 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
252. Id. at 1134. 
253. Id. 
254. 600 A.2d 512 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991). 
255. Id. at 518. 
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distribution of the value of unregistered corporate stock held by her 
husband, as measured from the date they began cohabiting rather than 
the date of marriage.
256
 Relying on Weiss, the court concluded: “If the 
parties by their combined efforts work as part of this ‘partnership’ to 
increase the value of an asset held by one of them, such increase in 
value . . . might be subject to treatment as a partnership interest, which in 
turn might be subject to equitable distribution.”257 The court added that 
divorce rules were to be construed “to effectuate the public policy 
underlying the equitable distribution law, which is to recognize that 
marriage is ‘a shared enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many 
ways . . . is akin to a partnership.’”258 
Another example, this one from Washington, demonstrates a similar 
judicial approach to pre-marital property and highlights how these 
problems are already relevant to same-sex couples. In Walsh v. 
Reynolds,
259
 Jean Walsh and her partner Kathryn Reynolds began living 
together in 1988.
260
 The women lived together for twenty years, and 
Walsh worked primarily as Reynold’s housekeeper, a job for which 
Reynolds paid her.
261
 Walsh also gave birth to two children who 
Reynolds adopted.
262
 In 2010, the women separated and sought to 
dissolve their domestic partnership, which had been registered in 
California in 2000 and Washington in 2009.
263
 A main point of 
contention was how to distribute the proceeds from the sale of the family 
home. In 2003, the couple had purchased and moved into a home in 
Federal Way. Both women “signed the deed, which expressly stated that 
they were ‘acquir[ing] all interest’ in the property ‘as joint tenants with 
right of survivorship, and not as community property or as tenants in 
common.’”264 
                                                     
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. (citing Smith v. Smith, 371 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1977) (quoting Rothman v. Rothman, 320 
A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974))). 
259. 183 Wash. App. 830, 335 P.3d 984 (2014), review denied, 182 Wash. 2d 1017, 345 P.3d 
784 (2015).  
260. Id. at 836, 335 P.3d at 986. 
261. Id. at 836–37, 335 P.3d at 986–87. 
262. Id. at 836, 335 P.3d at 987. 
263. Id. at 836–37, 335 P.3d at 986–87. Washington is a community property state that 
recognizes “equity” relationships, or common-law marriage. So at the time of the relationship 
dissolution, the couple was considered by the court to be in an “equity” relationship. 
264. Id. at 838, 335 P.3d at 987 (citation omitted). Because the mortgage was in Walsh’s 
name alone, the trial court concluded and the appellate court affirmed that they could not be joint 
tenants. Instead, the court said, they were tenants in common.  
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During the dissolution procedure, Walsh claimed that the proceeds 
should have gone to her alone rather than being split evenly by the trial 
court because she “made all financial contributions towards the 
mortgage and reconstruction of the Federal Way house . . . from her 
separate property funds.”265 Reynolds had not contributed to either the 
down payment or mortgage payments. In addition, Walsh had paid all 
the utility bills. Walsh “concede[d] that Reynolds contributed to the 
property in the form of ‘sweat equity.’”266 The trial court took this 
“sweat equity” into consideration and awarded Reynolds close to half 
the equity value of the home.
267
 The appellate court affirmed this award, 
concluding that it was “just and equitable” considering Reynolds’ “non-
financial contributions to the property.”268 The court, therefore, brought 
the family home into the marital estate despite the fact that Reynolds 
alone was financially responsible for the house and distributed its value 
equitably on account of its shared use and Walsh’s non-economic 
contributions. This result is akin to what the result would likely have 
been using New Jersey’s pre-marital property concept. The result is, 
furthermore, exemplary because it underscores the economic partnership 
at work in the couple’s relationship rather than the couple’s marital 
status. 
2.  Equitable Distribution Instead of Equitable Remedy 
In Blumenthal v. Brewer, as in many other cohabitant cases, one party 
requested the imposition of a constructive trust, a conventional equitable 
remedy.
269
 In cases that turn on the question of property rights for hybrid 
marriage partners, courts are confronted with one main choice. Courts 
can choose to enlarge the marital estate by including the contested asset 
and subsequently employ equitable distribution. Alternately, judges can 
deploy the same equitable remedies that are also used to provision 
cohabitants in cases of relationship termination. The court in McGee 
                                                     
265. Id. at 853, 335 P.3d at 995 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
266. Id. (citation omitted). 
267. Id.  
268. Id. at 855, 335 P.3d at 996 (“We hold that the trial court did not abuse its broad 
discretion in the manner in which it crafted a just and equitable division of the parties’ non-separate 
properties, including its allocation of the equity in the Federal Way property, after balancing the 
parties’ respective needs and contributions.”). The court also observed that “[t]he trial court also 
based its decision, in part, on the fact that it did not award any maintenance to Reynolds, the party 
with far less income and earning potential.” Id. 
269. See the discussion of Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), supra 
notes 155–63 and accompanying text. 
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elaborated on this choice: “The case can be viewed from the vantage 
point of the shared enterprise of marriage beginning before the 
ceremonial act, . . . or as one in which equitable remedies such as 
constructive trust, quasi contract or quantum meruit are invocable for 
equitable reasons.”270 
Some courts, however, have pointed out that certain equitable 
remedies are inapposite. For example, in McKeown v. Frederick,
271
 a 
New York case in which the husband sought to impose a constructive 
trust on the shared home, the court declined to do so.
272
 The court 
reasoned that the imposition of a constructive trust was the incorrect 
remedy because “constructive trusts are ‘fraud-rectifying’ remedies 
rather than ‘intent-enforcing remedies.’”273 Similarly, the Rhode Island 
Supreme Court stated, in another case concerning two former spouses 
disputing ownership of the shared home: “It is well settled that ‘[t]he 
underlying principle of a constructive trust is the equitable prevention of 
unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of another in situations in 
which legal title to property was obtained by fraud or in violation of a 
fiduciary or confidential relationship.’”274 Unless fraud exists, 
constructive trust may not be the appropriate remedy.
275
 
Implied or quasi contract has met with more success in courts that are 
reliant on leading cohabitant rights cases, Marvin v. Marvin
276
 in 
particular, to provide precedent.
277
 Implied contract claims more closely 
reflect the idea of a partnership agreement existing between the two 
parties. The implied contract prevents the “provider from free riding” 
and prevents unjust enrichment.
278
 This is particularly important when a 
couple specializes household labor and one member of the couple not 
                                                     
270. McGee v. McGee, 648 A.2d 1128, 1134 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 
271. No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2013). 
272. Id. at *17. 
273. Id. at *4. 
274. Dellagrotta v. Dellagrotta, 873 A.2d 101, 111 (R.I. 2005) (citing Renaud v. Ewart, 712 
A.2d 884, 885 (R.I. 1998)). 
275. See Carnivale v. Carnivale, 885 N.Y.S.2d 871, 878 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (“Use of the cause of 
action for constructive trust should not be distorted by courts as a device for enforcing an alleged 
intent to confer a benefit, gain, gift, or a material expression of love . . . [or] abused and misused as 
a means of redressing disappointed expectations, frustrated intentions, and failed hopes.”). 
276. 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976). 
277. For discussion of the beneficial uses of implied contract, see Elizabeth Scott, Marriage, 
Cohabitation and Collective Responsibility for Dependency, 225 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 225, 258 (2004) 
(“[C]ontract law can provide efficient default rules to clarify the implied understandings about 
property and support obligations between parties in long-term intimate unions.”). 
278. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 184. 
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only develops her career but also benefits from the unpaid contributions 
of the other. In Blumenthal v. Brewer, for example, a court might easily 
find that the couple had an implied contract to divide labor roles and 
compensate the homemaker accordingly. Nonetheless, a number of 
states are resistant to deploying implied contract in the service of 
cohabitant rights, and some states are beginning to legislate new rules 
for cohabitant property and palimony claims. The New Jersey 
legislature, for example, amended the state statute of frauds in 2010 to 
read that no action can be brought by “one party to a non-marital 
personal relationship to provide support or other consideration for the 
other party, either during the course of such relationship or after its 
termination” unless the agreement is in writing and both parties obtained 
independent counsel.
279
 In a leading New York case on cohabitant 
property rights, Morone v. Morone,
280
 the Court similarly ruled that any 
claim to property rights for a cohabitant had to be based on an explicit 
contract.
281
 In the absence of an explicit contract or marriage status, the 
Court stated, it was too difficult to determine what kind of bargain the 
parties had made.
282
 The Court remarked that, as with common law 
marriage, allowing cohabitant property claims “could work substantial 
justice in certain cases, [but] there was no built-in method for 
distinguishing between valid and specious claims.”283 
The most significant problem, however, with the use of equitable 
remedies to provision partners in hybrid marriages is that equitable 
remedies entrench compensation in the realm of judicial discretion rather 
than legal entitlement, transforming a right into a discretionary award.
284
 
Equitable remedies therefore replicate the problems inherent in using 
distribution and maintenance instead of property division to compensate 
spouses for their unpaid contributions. Courts choosing to look at assets 
                                                     
279. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 25:1-5 (West, Westlaw through 2015). Subsequently, in New Jersey, 
court decisions have clarified that “oral palimony agreements predating the 2010 Amendment to the 
Statute of Frauds are not extinguished by the new law.” Maeker v. Ross, 99 A.3d 795, 805 (N.J. 
2014). 
280. 413 N.E.2d 1154 (N.Y. 1980). 
281. Id. at 1158. Regarding the constructive trust, a court in 2013 mentioned that 
“constructive trusts are ‘fraud-rectifying’ remedies rather than ‘intent-enforcing remedies.’” 
McKeown v. Frederick, No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 2013) 
(citations omitted). 
282. Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1157–58. 
283. Id. 
284. See Regan, supra note 47, at 2307 (“Typically, an individual deploys property rhetoric 
when she wishes to frame a claim to resources as a request for the recognition of a right arising 
either by virtue of her own efforts or as the result of a transaction involving an exchange for fair 
value.”). 
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acquired outside of marriage as cohabitant property rather than pre-
marital property neither further the goals of economic partnership nor 
reflect the true nature of marital bargains. 
B.  Measuring Duration and Modified Formalism 
Although creating pre-marital property provides a solution for asset-
specific claims and contests, there are also property questions that turn 
on the durational measure of the relationship, such as division of 
income, pension, and other cumulative assets. Duration matters for the 
calculation of certain benefits, such as social security, and for awards of 
spousal maintenance.
285
 Likewise, duration matters because length of 
marriage is a critical factor that courts use in the distribution phase of 
property division.
286
 Courts therefore need to know not just how to 
characterize a particular asset but also when to “flip the switch” and start 
counting property for inclusion in the marital estate. This raises the 
question of when an economic partnership begins. In this section, I 
provide a framework for knowing when an economic partnership exists 
through the identification of legal markers. I also discuss why this 
formalist framework has advantages over a functionalist approach, for 
reasons of both judicial efficiency and personal autonomy. 
1.  Timing Relationships Through Legal Markers 
In a recent case from Connecticut, Mueller v. Tepler,
287
 the State 
Supreme Court ruled that a same-sex partner could assert a spousal loss 
of consortium claim against physicians even though she was not married 
to the plaintiff at the time of the alleged negligent conduct.
288
 The Court 
concluded, however, that the partner would have to prove that “the 
couple would have been married when the underlying tort occurred but 
for the existence of a bar on such marriages under the laws of this 
state.”289 The natural question that follows is how a same-sex couple 
                                                     
285. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West, Westlaw through 2015). 
286. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. ANN. § 3502(1) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess.).  
287. 95 A.3d 1011 (Conn. 2014). 
288. Id. at 1030. 
289. Id. at 1026. The Court also created a requirement that “the marriage would not have been 
inconsistent with public policy,” which it said “places clear limits on liability for such claims.” Id. 
But see Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946, 951 (Mass. 2008) (“[H]owever sympathetic we may be 
to the discriminatory effects the [invalidated] marriage licensing statute had . . . to allow Kalish to 
recover for a loss of consortium if she can prove she would have been married but for the ban on 
same-sex marriage could open numbers of cases in all areas of law to the same argument.”). 
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proves that they would have been married absent legal impediment. As 
Hanoch Dagan and Michael Heller observe, “boundary disputes . . . pose 
a challenge to legal architects.”290 What actions and behaviors should a 
court look to as signals? I propose that courts should look for instances 
of clear legal intention to form an economic partnership. Courts need to 
have bright-line markers because boundary “concerns may justify 
heightened formalities for entry.”291 The legal moments can be asset-
specific, as in the case of a family home. In these cases, the court does 
not have to determine a starting point but rather the intention tied to the 
purchase of an asset. More difficult are determining which legal 
moments communicate the beginning of a partnership period, a point at 
which a court can start counting marital property. 
In same-sex hybrid cases it is likely—at least for the duration of this 
transitional period—that couples will have entered into domestic 
partnerships or civil unions prior to being legally married. These are true 
markers of legal intent to live as if married and to enter into an economic 
partnership involving shared benefits, assets, and dependency. Domestic 
partnerships and civil unions clearly mark moments outside of marriage 
that demonstrate partnership formation.
292
 For this reason, the Social 
Security Administration allows an applicant for spousal benefits to tack 
on time spent as registered domestic partners to time of marriage.
293
 
Accordingly, a court looking at the facts of Blumenthal v. Brewer for 
property division purposes would, for example, have this option in 
deciding when to begin measuring the marital estate. In that case, several 
instances of legal intention existed because the couple was not only a 
functional family; they “also took legal steps because of their lifelong 
commitment.”294 They cross-adopted their three children, documented 
their partnership in the Chicago “Domestic Partner Registry,” and took 
out a marriage license in Massachusetts.
295
 A court might, therefore, 
begin counting assets in the marital estate as of the moment the couple 
became registered domestic partners. 
                                                     
290. Hanoch Dagan & Michael Heller, Freedom of Contracts 55 (Columbia Law & Econ., 
Working Paper No. 458, 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325254. 
291. Id. 
292. See Kelly, supra note 67, at 44 (“Other good evidence is if a couple registers as domestic 
partners under a system of rules that recognizes marriage-like legal obligations between partners.”). 
293. See GN00210.004 Non-Marital Relationships (Such as Civil Unions and Domestic 
Partnerships), SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., http://policy.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0200210004 (last visited 
Aug. 18, 2015). This has helped many same-sex couples reach the nine-month minimum. 
294. Blumenthal v. Brewer, 24 N.E.3d 168, 171 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014), appeal allowed, 31 
N.E.3d 767 (Ill. 2015). 
295. Id. at 171–72. 
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In another example, Walsh v. Reynolds, several such indicators 
existed and the Washington appellate court was called upon to review 
the question of when the couple’s “equity relationship” began for 
property division purposes.
296
 In that case, the couple registered as 
domestic partners in California in 2000 and in Washington in 2009.
297
 
The trial court determined that the “equity relationship” began on 
January 1, 2005, the date on which California amended its domestic 
partnership statute to extend community property rights to registered 
domestic partners.
298
 Walsh contended on appeal that the starting point 
for measuring their marital property was 2009, when the couple 
registered their domestic partnership in Washington.
299
 Reynolds, on the 
other hand, claimed that the “equity relationship” began in 1988 at the 
start of their relationship.
300
 
The appellate court stated: “There are several other dates [other than 
that used by the trial court] that could serve as starting points for 
application of this doctrine here,” and discussed using the date on which 
the couple registered as domestic partners in California in 2000.
301
 The 
court also suggested that Washington’s traditional common law test, a 
five-factor test, was applicable in the situation at hand, particularly 
because the trial court had remarked that the common law rule would 
have governed “had Walsh and Reynolds been a legally recognized 
heterosexual marriage.”302 Ultimately, the appellate court reversed the 
trial court and remanded the case for new findings with respect to when 
the “equity relationship” began and, subsequently, a revised order for 
property distribution.
303
  
Furthermore, because same-sex couples were unable to access marital 
benefits prior to Windsor v. United States,
304
 and, subsequently, 
Obergefell v. Hodges,
305
 many have been encouraged to engage in estate 
planning and to draft cohabitation agreements. LGBT organizations like 
                                                     
296. Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wash. App. 830, 830, 335 P.3d 984, 984 (2014), review denied, 
182 Wash. 2d 1017, 345 P.3d 784 (2015). 
297. Id. at 837–38, 335 P.3d at 987. 
298. Id. at 840, 335 P.3d at 988–89. 
299. Id. at 851, 335 P.3d at 994.  
300. Id. at 841, 335 P.3d at 989. 
301. Id. at 847, 335 P.3d at 992. 
302. Id. at 847–48, 852–53, 335 P.3d at 992, 995 (“We see no reason why the five Long 
‘equity relationship’ factors that the trial court applied to the parties’ post–2005 relationship should 
not also apply to their pre–2005 domestic partnership relationship in California.”). 
303. Id. at 859, 335 P.3d at 998. 
304. 570 U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
305. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
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Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders,
306
 Lambda Legal,
307
 and the 
National Center for Lesbian Rights
308
 began, in the early days of the gay 
rights and marriage equality movements, to offer robust information 
about same-sex estate planning and legal strategies for obtaining 
economic partnership rights outside of marriage. Martha Ertman, 
claiming that family law should support “Plan B” contracts, observes 
that “the long history of family exchanges argues for spouses holding 
onto their contractual freedom.”309 These types of contracts are legal 
indicators of both shared purpose and relationship commitment, and act 
as a strong signal for courts to begin measuring and counting pre-marital 
property. These contracts may take the shape of designated beneficiary 
agreements, such as the ones that exist in Colorado, which allow 
unmarried parties to give each other rights such as “the right to have 
standing to sue for wrongful death” in the event of one party’s death and 
to name each other as beneficiaries in testamentary trusts for the 
purposes of a nonprobate transfer on death, pension plans, and life 
insurance.
310
 Other legal markers may include any form of registered 
partnership that approximate what Erez Aloni calls for in the form of a 
“registered contractual relationship.”311 These contracts all provide a 
means for same-sex couples (and also different-sex couples) to signal 
intent. Looking forward, these types of relationship contracts—like pre-
marital and marital contracts—also provide a means for both same- and 
different-sex couples to shape the contours of their relationships by 
opting out of default sharing rules and marking certain kinds of property 
or income as separate. 
                                                     
306. See generally GAY & LESBIAN ADVOCATES & DEFENDERS, LEGAL PLANNING FOR 
SAME-SEX COUPLES: PREPARING FOR THE UNEXPECTED (2014), available at 
http://www.glad.org/uploads/docs/publications/legal-planning-couples.pdf (providing estate-
planning advice and resources for same-sex couples). 
307. See generally LAMBDA LEGAL, TAKE THE POWER: TOOLS FOR LIFE AND FINANCIAL 
PLANNING (2014), available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/sites/default/files/publications/ 
downloads/take_the_power_-_2014_-_complete_pdf_for_website.pdf (providing an online guide 
for same-sex estate planning). 
308. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, YOUR LEGACY OF JUSTICE: PLANNED 
GIVING QUESTIONS & ANSWERS FOR LGBT PEOPLE (2013), available at http://www.nclrights.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/07/NCLR-Estate-Planning-11.04.13.pdf. 
309. ERTMAN, supra note 68, at 175. Plan B contracts, as opposed to Plan A ones, are those 
that contract for something other than the marital default rules. See also Scott, supra note 277, for a 
discussion of the uses of contract law in family design.  
310. See Colorado’s Designated Beneficiary Agreement Act, COLO. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.cobar.org/index.cfm/ID/21614 (last visited Aug. 19, 2015); Designated Beneficiary 
Agreement, DENVERGOV.ORG, https://www.denvergov.org/Portals/777/documents/MarriageCivil 
Unions/Designated%20Beneficiary%20Agreement.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2015). 
311. Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 574, 576, 607 (2013). 
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Civil unions, registered domestic partnerships, designated beneficiary 
relationships, and relationship contracts all enable couples to signal a 
clear legal intent. These legal relationships allow couples to share a 
variety of assets as well as benefits, such as health care, just as they 
grant individuals certain rights, such as beneficiary rights and standing 
rights to pursue certain claims.
312
 The intent is not an implicit one made 
manifest through either time and work put into a relationship or shared 
living. Instead, in these instances, couples make an affirmative decision 
to define their relationship through a legal framework and, in all cases 
except private contracting, the couple chooses to mediate their 
relationship through the State. These are opt-in relationships that require 
consideration and planning as well as personal agency. That these 
relationship forms constitute dispositive examples of legal intention is 
evident from the fact that many states have automatically converted 
either civil unions or domestic partnerships into marriages.
313
 
Some scholars and commentators suggest a functionalist approach 
and the use of significant events in the life of a couple, such as the start 
of cohabitation or the birth of shared children, to determine the 
beginning date of the couple’s relationship. This type of functional 
analysis has roots in common law marriage. In common law marriage, 
courts traditionally looked for indicators of economic entanglement, 
such as the sharing of living expenses and the establishment of joint 
bank accounts, including checking, savings, or investment accounts, as 
well as cohabitation and shared parenting.
314
 In Washington, the five-
factor test for determining whether a couple is engaged in an “equity” or 
“meretricious” relationship underscores the role of functionality. The 
factors include continuous cohabitation, relationship duration, 
relationship purpose, pooling of resources, and parties’ intent.315 
Likewise, the American Law Institute, in its model rules for granting 
                                                     
312. See e.g., Colorado’s Designated Beneficiary Agreement Act, supra note 310. 
313. For example, once Connecticut began permitting same-sex marriage, the state converted 
all civil unions into marriages. NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, MARRIAGE, DOMESTIC 
PARTNERSHIPS, AND CIVIL UNIONS: SAME-SEX COUPLES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES (2015), 
http://www.nclrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/Relationship-Recognition.pdf. Likewise, in 
Delaware, on July 1, 2014, all remaining civil unions were automatically converted to marriages by 
operation of law. Id. For a survey of how states have treated this issue, see id. This strategy of 
converting civil unions into marriages is problematic from an autonomy standpoint, because in 
many states it is automatic rather than opt-in.  
314. GÖRAN LIND, COMMON LAW MARRIAGE: A LEGAL INSTITUTION FOR COHABITATION 
536–42 (2008). 
315. Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wash. App. 830, 846, 335 P.3d 984, 991 (2014), review denied, 
182 Wash. 2d 1017, 345 P.3d 784 (2015). 
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domestic partners’ rights, looks to continuous cohabitation and length of 
relationship, as well as economic entanglement.
316
 
From this perspective, joint bank accounts or investments made 
together certainly indicate shared economic purpose, as do instances of 
more discretionary spending, such as joint charitable giving.
317
 These 
indicators do not, however, demonstrate the level of relationship 
commitment necessary to switch on the counting of marital property. 
These factors could signal that two people are anything from roommates 
to investment partners. The problem is that, “[i]n comparison with 
marriage, cohabitation relationships are not regulated by clearly defined 
norms that prescribe behavioral expectations of financial support and 
sharing.”318 
Alternately, courts using a functional analysis have also looked to 
cohabitation, shared parenting, and various types of non-legal wedding 
and commitment ceremonies to indicate partnership.
319
 While these are 
undoubtedly important events and do represent a type of lived intimacy, 
they do not necessarily signal an intention to form either a legal or an 
economic unit.
320
 The presence of children means that two individuals 
share responsibility for the project of childrearing. Shared parenting is, 
however, not necessarily an indicator or a continuing intimate 
relationship, and it is something that even most divorced couples do. 
Childbearing and rearing is, increasingly, a project that is disaggregated 
from marriage or even intimate relationships.
321
 Continuous cohabitation 
is also thought to indicate a shared life and strong form of intimacy. 
However, cohabitation has many guises and couples who cohabitate do 
so for a variety of reasons—for efficiency purposes, to try shared living 
in contemplation of marriage, or out of economic necessity.
322
 This 
                                                     
316. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.03 (Supp. 2002). 
317. See Kelly, supra note 67, at 44 (“[T]he key assessment is how much the couple has 
merged their financial resources.”). 
318. Scott, supra note 277, at 248. 
319. See generally Allison Tait, Polygamy, Publicity and Locality: The Place of the Public in 
Marriage Practice, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 173 (2011). 
320. Moreover, the issue of economic partnership with respect to a child is mediated through 
questions about child support, which are bracketed here.  
321. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Census: More First-Time Mothers Give Birth out of Wedlock, 
WASH. TIMES (July 8, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/jul/8/census-more-first-
time-mothers-give-birth-out-wedl/?page=all; Meet the Co-Parents: Friends Not Lovers, THE 
TELEGRAPH (July 31, 2011), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/mother-tongue/8659494/Meet-the-
co-parents-friends-not-lovers.html. 
322. Cohabitation F.A.Q., UNMARRIED EQUALITY, http://www.unmarried.org/cohabitation/ 
faq/#cohabreasons (last visited Sept. 28, 2015). 
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variation in levels of commitment makes it difficult to say that 
cohabitation signals a clear intent to be in a binding legal relationship. 
In fact, courts that backdate property rights to the beginning of a 
relationship or cohabitation may, in fact, be contravening the intention of 
the partners, and creating economic injustice. In the Walsh case, if the 
trial court determined that the “equity relationship” began when the two 
women started living together, the court would have no way of knowing 
what the couple’s actual intention was at the time.323 Using the moment 
that they registered their domestic partnership in California, however, 
allows the court to know with greater certainty what the parties intended. 
Discussing this problem, Katherine Franke relates the example of a 
lesbian couple who dated—with periods of conflict and separation—for 
a number of years before getting married. During the divorce 
proceedings, the court “‘back-dated’ their marriage to when [the couple] 
started dating rather than to when they legally married.”324 Franke states 
that the “easy and obvious choice”325 would have been for the court to 
use the date of marriage. Instead, the judge “wrote in her judgment that 
prior to marriage, ‘they had a nine year relationship when they 
functioned as a couple.’”326 This backdating to a functional relationship 
moment rather than a legal one resulted in the wealthier spouse being 
liable for alimony and property division when the couple had made an 
oral agreement to the contrary prior to their marriage. As Elizabeth Scott 
has remarked: “The challenge is to design clear criteria that separate 
marriage-like unions from those in which the parties are not married 
because they do not want marital commitment or obligations.”327 What is 
important, then, is that courts look to legal indicators outside of marriage 
that signal the intention to form an economic partnership. 
2.  Enabling Judicial Efficiency and Personal Autonomy 
There are drawbacks to using legal markers as opposed to more 
                                                     
323. One of the five factors in determining whether an equity relationship exists is “parties’ 
intent.” Walsh v. Reynolds, 183 Wash. App. 830, 846, 336 P.3d 984, 991 (2014), review denied, 
182 Wash. 2d 1017, 346 P.3d 784 (2015). However, at the dissolution of a relationship, parties may 
easily disagree or remember differently what intent existed at what point in time.  
324. KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY (forthcoming 
2015). 
325. Id.  
326. Id.  
327. See Scott, supra note 277, at 258. Scott proposes the use of length of relationship as a 
primary criterion. Id. at 259 (“[A] cohabitation period of substantial duration is the best available 
proxy for commitment.”). 
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functional and informal ones. Using legal markers privileges those 
individuals who have access to legal representation and can write 
cohabitation agreements, wills, and other legal documents. These are 
often the same individuals who have assets to protect, investments to 
manage, and jobs that provide access to retirement savings as well as 
health care and other benefits. In other words, the use of legal markers 
increases the pre-existing systemic bias against economically 
disadvantaged populations. These populations do not have access to 
legal advice, to jobs with benefits like healthcare or life insurance, or 
even sometimes to bank accounts. These groups are less likely to own 
property, make wills, or engage in any estate planning. They are, overall, 
less likely to have resources to protect or the understanding of what 
benefits they might receive through legal planning. To bias the system of 
property rules against these populations may seem both descriptively 
unjust and normatively undesirable. 
There are, nonetheless, substantial benefits to a modified formalist 
approach both in terms of judicial efficiency and personal autonomy.
328
 
First, having a set of rules or factors for courts to use in determining 
when an economic partnership merits judicial notice and treatment as a 
marital or pre-marital relationship relieves courts from the burden of 
extremely fact-intensive personal inquiries into intimate relationships. 
One New York court stated the problem in this way: 
[J]udicial inquiry into the timing and context of premarital 
“promises” or “statements of present intention” will involve 
judges in matters of the heart that are intrusive on sensitive 
subjective feelings—when did we love each other enough to be 
considered in a fiduciary relationship—and lead to speculation 
and solipsistic moral judgments, which the courts are incapable 
of easily adjudicating and appellate courts will be challenged to 
review.
329
 
Courts can rarely know what two individuals promised one another in 
the absence of documentary evidence, not least because at the point of 
divorce both parties usually recall quite differently what promises they 
made and which were broken. Asking courts to adjudicate these kinds of 
                                                     
328. In describing a modified formalist approach, I take one of the definitions put forth by 
Frederick Schauer, namely “the concept of decisionmaking according to rule.” Frederick Schauer, 
Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (emphasis in original); see also Rebecca Aviel, A New 
Formalism for Family Law, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2010 (defining formalism as “the 
extent to which family law doctrines provide determinate instructions that can be more or less 
mechanically applied to domestic relations disputes”). 
329. McKeown v. Frederick, No. 12/5055, 2013 WL 3068697, at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 18, 
2013). 
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questions without rules, or at the very least a set of guidelines, is 
administratively burdensome and an endeavor prone to error.
330
 Bright 
line rules therefore aid courts in evaluating cases effectively and 
consistently, and these “precise rules” that provide clear starting signals 
in turn help individuals “predict the consequences of future 
contingencies and to plan and structure their lives accordingly.”331 These 
types of inquiries, moreover, recall the common law marriage 
framework, which most courts and legislatures have rejected as against 
public policy.
332
 
Finally, relying on rules rather than functional analyses provides a 
safeguard against conscription. There are couples who, according to a 
functional analysis, are engaged in an economic partnership and would 
therefore count as “married.” However, to count some of these couples 
as married when they were not may result in unfair property division. 
Take Franke’s example of a couple who cohabited and shared expenses 
yet were not married. Despite their demonstrated intention to regulate 
their own relationship arrangement before marriage, the court used a 
functional analysis and conscripted them into marriage before they were 
legally married. The outcome was to the detriment of their agreement 
and intentions, and arguably unfair to the one who ended up paying 
alimony and dividing a larger pot of marital property than she intended. 
On the other hand, in Blumenthal v. Brewer, the court could have used 
legal markers, such as the moment when the couple entered their names 
into the Domestic Partnership Registry or obtained a marriage license—
to start counting marital property. In that instance, backdating would not 
have contravened the intention of the parties, which was to organize 
their lives, their household, and their assets as if they were married. 
Both same- and different-sex couples may prefer to remain off the 
marital grid for any number of personal reasons, and courts should 
                                                     
330. Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1157 (N.Y. 1980) (“For courts to attempt through 
hindsight to sort out the intentions of the parties and affix jural significance to conduct carried out 
within an essentially private and generally noncontractual relationship runs too great a risk of 
error.”). 
331. DAGAN, supra note 196, at 194; see also Jessica A. Clarke, Identity and Form, 103 
CALIF. L. REV. 747, 785 (2015) (“Formality also provides convenient evidence of marriage. 
Formality cuts against the fraud concerns that plague elective marriage regimes, which must 
examine myriad forms of evidence for indicia of intent to be married.”); Kelly, supra note 67, at 43 
(“[D]efault rules in family law . . . are more predictable, can more reliably protect vulnerable 
persons, and are more easily applied by families without legal assistance.”). 
332. See Morone, 413 N.E.2d at 1155 (holding use of implied-contract theory was 
“inconsistent with the legislative policy enunciated in 1933 when common-law marriages were 
abolished in New York,” and declining to follow Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976)). 
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recognize and respect this choice.
333
 There are couples who have 
philosophical objections to the institution itself. Women—in both same- 
and different-sex relationships—may choose not to opt into a legal 
relationship that is fraught with the vestiges of historical oppression. 
Some couples may simply decide that they prefer a relationship 
unmediated by the State. Couples may also have financial concerns. For 
the majority of couples, there are financial incentives to marry. 
However, this is not true for everyone. Certain couples face a tax penalty 
upon marriage, and may choose therefore to remain unmarried. Other 
couples choose not to marry because they might lose benefits or other 
entitlements in doing so. Older couples in particular may choose to live 
as if married without legally marrying in order to keep certain pension or 
military benefits. Individuals also lose spousal support once they 
remarry. Furthermore, certain individuals may choose not to marry to 
protect themselves financially—to maintain a separation of debt between 
themselves and their partner, to protect their credit rating, or to avoid 
liability for medical expenses or other possible new debt. For the sake of 
these couples, and in order to protect personal autonomy, courts should 
safeguard the individual’s right to stay unmarried and not be judicially 
conscripted into an economic partnership. Rather, courts should use 
legal markers to evaluate when pre-marital property exists and enlarge 
marital estates. 
CONCLUSION 
After the battle for marriage equality comes the reality of divorce. As 
an increasing number of same-sex couples avail themselves of new 
marriage rights, same-sex couples will also be divorcing in increasing 
numbers. This Article addresses the ways in which divorce and marital 
property rules threaten to undermine the goals of marriage equality 
without attention and reform. Issues arising in same-sex divorces 
highlight the failing of current marital property rules to properly 
compensate all spouses for their marital contributions and underscore 
the ways in which courts have failed to take seriously the idea of 
economic partnership, the cornerstone concept of equitable distribution. 
The two major failings of the equitable distribution statutes relate to 
when the calculation of the marital estate begins and what gets counted 
as marital property. The timing concern made salient by same-sex 
“hybrid” cases—in which the spouses have been long-term cohabiting 
                                                     
333. See Clarke, supra note 331, at 35 (“Formal marriage also gives couples the ability to stay 
off the grid, opting out of legal marriage and the benefits and burdens it might entail.”). 
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partners but short-term marital partners—is the question of when an 
economic partnership begins. Economic partnerships between romantic 
partners do not magically begin at the moment of marriage. Instead, they 
develop at various points of intimacy and commitment both in and 
outside of marriage. A couple may develop an economic partnership 
while on the path to marriage (just as couples often maintain economic 
ties after marriage). Consequently, I propose that courts use the category 
of “pre-marital” property, in hybrid cases, to count assets and income 
acquired outside of but in contemplation of marriage. Courts should, in 
these cases, start counting pre-marital property from the point at which 
the couple made a sufficient showing that they possessed the intent to 
form an economic partnership as well as a legal relationship. 
With respect to what gets characterized as marital property, the 
central problem is the resistance of courts to properly count spousal 
contributions, whether to the education of the other spouse or to the 
other spouse’s business interests, when characterizing and distributing 
property. By undervaluing these spousal contributions, courts are failing 
to recognize the marital bargains in place and the economic partnerships 
at work. Individual partners in a marriage should not be financially 
penalized for the householding arrangements that put them into low-paid 
or unpaid jobs for the benefit of the couple. The conventional approach 
of compensating the low earner at divorce through distribution or 
support is both inadequate and theoretically inapposite. If courts were 
instead to count as property one spouse’s contributions to the degree that 
the spouse enhances the other’s earning capacity and presume an equal 
division, it would positively impact how spouses bargain with one 
another, how diverse roles get valued in the marital bargain, and how 
gender is both prescribed and performed within marriage. 
These proposals for change, inspired by the advent of same-sex 
divorce and the need for divorce equality, provide a blueprint for courts 
as they encounter an increasing number of same-sex divorces. At the 
same time, these proposals will benefit all couples, in that modified 
equitable distribution norms will better reflect the infinite variety of 
marital bargains that couples make. Reforming equitable distribution in 
order to better reflect the ideal of marriage as an economic partnership 
will help reshape the gendered contours of marriage by recalibrating the 
values attached to various forms of labor. Ultimately, equitable 
compensation for spousal contributions will help advance the aims of 
marriage equality by bringing about divorce equality. 
 
